

Suseeva D.A.¹, Toropitsyn I.V.², Kundakbayeva Zh.³

¹doctor, professor, B.B. Gorodovikov Kalmyk State University, Kalmykia, Elista, e-mail: suseeva@gmail.com

²Ph.D., Associate Professor Astrakhan State University, Russia, Astrakhan, e-mail: itoropitsyn@mail.ru

³doctor, professor, al-Farabi Kazakh National University, e-mail: janbekkun@mail.ru

**NEW SEARCHES ON THE KAZAKH-KALMYK RELATIONS
OF THE FIRST HALF OF 1740S:
NEW ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS FROM ELISTA**

On the base of new archival documents from the National Archive Republic of Kamykia this paper examines V.N. Tatishchev's activities to regulate the relations between Kazakhs and Kalmyks during 1741-1745 crisis in Kalmyk Khanate. Thanks to the tireless attention and consistent actions, V.N. Tatishchev managed to get in touch with the Kazakh elite and promote the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Kazakhs and the Kalmyks. The management style of V.N. Tatishchev, aimed at establishing an alliance with the nomadic elite, and the policy of peaceful conquest of the steppes, allowed Russia to control the border zone, unfortified by structures, without the use of military force. This was important during the waretime (Russian- Sweden war of 1741-1743). And as subsequent events showed, I. Neplyuev's tough management style led to opposition with the Kazakh Khan Abulhair, which led to a breach of stability in the region. The next period of time 1743-1744 was characterized by numerous raids of Kazakhs to Russian fortresses and neighboring Kalmyks. The stability of the border region has been broken. Regular military units were not enough. The result was that the situation demanded a lot of attention from both central and local governments.

Key words: National Archive of the Republic of Kalmykia, V.N. Tatishchev, borderline zone, Kazakhs, Volga Kalmyks, management style.

Сусеева Д.А.¹, Торопицын И.В.², Құндақбаева Ж.Б.³

¹В.В. Городовиков атындағы Қалмық мемлекеттік университетінің профессоры, Калмыкия, Элиста қ., е-mail: suseeva@gmail.com

²PhD, Астрахань Мемлекеттік университетінің қауымдастырылған профессоры, Ресей, Астрахань қ., е-mail: itoropitsyn@mail.ru

³т.ғ.д., профессор, әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Қазақстан, Алматы қ., е-mail: janbekkun@mail.ru

**XVIII ғасырдың 40-шы жылдарының бірінші жартысындағы
қазақ-қалмақ қатынастары туралы жаңа мәліметтер:
Элистадан алынған мұрағаттық мәліметтер**

Мақала Бюджеттік мекеме Қалмақ Республикасының Ұлттық мұрағатында жаңа мұрағаттық деректер негізінде анықталған 1741-1745 жылдардағы дағдарыс кезінде қалмақтармен қазақтардың өзара қарым-қатынасын реттеу бойынша В.Н. Татищевтің қызметі туралы. Үздіксіз және жүйелі әрекеттің арқасында В.Н. Татищев қазақ элитасымен байланыс орнатып, қазақтар мен қалмақтар арасында бітімгершілік келісім орнатуға ықпал етті. Көшпелі элитамен одақты орнатуға бағытталған В.Н. Татищевтің басқару тәсілі және даланы бейбіт жолмен жаулап алу саясаты Ресейге әскери күш қолданбай, бекемделген құрылыстармен шекара аймағын бақылауға мүмкіндік берді. Бұл Швециямен (1741-1743 жж.) соғыс кезінде маңызды болды. Бұдан кейінгі оқиғалар көрсеткендей, И. Неплюевтің қатал басқару үлгісі қазақ ханы Әбілхайырдың тарапынан қарсы әрекет етуге алып келді, бұл аймақтағы тұрақтылықтың бұзылуына әкелді. 1743-1744 жылдар аралығы қазақтардың Ресей бекіністеріне және көршілес қалмақтарға жасаған көптеген шабуылымен сипатталады. Бұл жергілікті және орталық үкіметтің күштері мен құралдары алаңдатты.

Түйін сөздер: Қалмақ Республикасының Мемлекеттік мұрағаты, В.Н. Татищев, шекаралық аймақ, қазақтар, волжалық қалмақтар, басқару тәсілі.

Сусеева Д.А.¹, Торопицын И.В.², Кундакбаева Ж.Б.³

¹профессор Калмыцкого государственного университета им. В.В. Городовикова, Калмыкия, г. Элиста, e-mail: suseeva@gmail.com

²PhD, ассоциированный профессор Астраханского Государственного университета, Россия, г. Астрахань, e-mail: itoropitsyn@mail.ru

³д.и.н., профессор Казахского национального университета имени аль-Фараби, Казахстан, г. Алматы, e-mail: janbekkun@mail.ru

**Новые данные о казахско-калмыцких отношениях
первой половины 40-х годов XVIII века:
архивные находки из Элисты**

В данной статье на основе новых архивных данных, выявленных в Бюджетном учреждении «Национальный архив Республики Калмыкия» рассматривается деятельность В.Н. Татищева по регулированию взаимоотношений казахов с калмыками в период кризиса в Калмыцком ханстве 1741-1745 гг. Благодаря неустанному вниманию и последовательным действиям, В.Н. Татищеву удалось войти в контакт с казахской элитой и содействовать заключению мирного договора между казахами и калмыками. Манера управления В.Н. Татищева, направленная на установление союза с кочевой элитой, и политика мирного завоевания степи позволили России контролировать пограничную зону, неукрепленную сооружениями, без применения военной силы. Это было важно в период войны со Швецией (1741-1743 гг.). И как показали последующие события, жесткая манера управления И.Неплюева привела к противодействию со стороны казахского хана Абулхаира, что привело к нарушению стабильности в регионе. Период 1743-1744 гг. характеризуется многочисленными рейдами казахов на российские крепости и соседних калмыков. Это отвлекало силы и средства как местного, так и центрального правительства.

Ключевые слова: Национальный архив Республики Калмыкия, В.Н. Татищев, пограничная зона, казахи, волжские калмыки, манера управления.

Introduction

At the beginning of the 1740s, the situation on the south-eastern borderlines of Russia, the relationship between Kalmyks and Kazakhs, becomes quite acute for Russia. During this period, the Kalmyk Khanate was in crisis, which the famous Kalmyk researcher A.V. Tsyuryumov called the «succession crisis of 1741-1742» and «the second crisis of 1742-1745» (Tsyuryumov, 2005; Tsyuryumov, 2007; Kurapov, 2017: 25).

In addition, Russia in the region had strategic objectives: further advancing in the Northern Caspian region. For this, the Kazakhs and Kalmyks should be kept in obedience and gradually integrated into the empire.

Since this frontier of Russia was not yet equipped with fortified structures, troops were not placed there, the problem of control over the situation there completely depended on the local executors.

By the beginning of the 1740s Russia had a designated plan for the mutual raids of the Kazakhs and Kalmyks. This plan was formulated in 1740 in the report of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs to the Empress «On measures to prevent the attacks of the Kirghiz-Kaysaks on the Kalmyk uluses».

The report reflected the ambivalence towards the state of Kazakh-Kalmyk relations. On the one hand, «the government considered» some benefit

from their mutual hostility: «Kalmyks repeatedly had plans to withdraw from the Volga to the Mungals and Kakunur Kalmyks, but often canceled their plans, as they often have to go through the hostile Kirghiz-Kaysan people, therefore, often returned back from Yak-river. «The second benefit is that now the Kirghiz Kaysaks are in the allegiance of Her Imperial Majesty, and if from the ones that the Russian Empire wanted to repair the opposition, then it's common with the salary of some dacha or with the addition of a small part of the Russian troops, it seems possible to oppose their intentions». On the other hand, the mutual attacks of the Kazakhs and Kalmyks violated the plans of the government to further advance in the region. «Harm from their quarrels: when Kalmyks go to Kirghiz-Kaisaks to drive horses away, they have no success, then, so that they don't return to their homes, run to Yaitsky Cossack's town and to Samara, and from Cossacks they steal horses, and Russian people rob and beat. Also the Kazakhs. For example, in the wartime, they came from the Volga and in the Salt lakes near Astrakhan, Krasny Yar and Cherniy Yar, were beat the passers-by Russians, robbed, captered, and in 1740, 140 captured Astrakhan Yurt Tatars took with them». In its report, the Collegium of Foreign Affairs proposed measures to curb «strong attacks between them» «without the empress's permission» – to build fortresses along the Yaik River, below the

Yaitsky Cossack town and above the city of Guryev. (Kundakbayeva 2005: 217,218).

Thus, due to the fact that the Kalmyk Khanate was extremely weakened by the crisis, the government retreated from the previously developed plan and decided to take on the mission of protecting the Kalmyks from the attacks of the Kazakhs: «it took vigorous measures to protect the Kalmyks». Although for these purposes, five dragoon teams were sent to the border region at the Tsaritsyn line at the disposal of Tsaritsyn commandants Koltsov and Beklemishev, who was in Kalmyk affairs (Kundakbaeva, 2005a: 219), there was clearly not enough military forces.

We must not forget that the summer of 1741 was the beginning of the Russian-Swedish war (1741-1743) and the situation on the south-eastern boerderlines required attention and distracted Russia. Under these conditions, the central government transfers the problems in the border zone to the local authorities, in particular V.N. Tatishchev. But the fact is that this zone was in the government entity of two governors at once: the Orenburg governor was in charge of the territory above Guriev town, and the territory below Guriev town was under the administration of Astrakhan governor. It depended on their actions whether the stability of the border zone would be ensured without the use of military force.

In this article, on the basis of new archival data revealed in the Budget Agency of the Republic of Kalmykia «National Archive», two different approaches of the local authorities to regulate the relations of Kalmyks with the Kazakhs during the crisis of the Kalmyk Khanate 1741-1745 are considered.

Literature review

Back in the 1940s, M.P. Vyatkin noted that in the administration of their duties, some governors held to a tougher line, they sought to keep the Kazakhs in obedience by building fortified lines, organizing armed detachments.

Others believed that the policy of «peaceful conquest of the steppe» by establishing an alliance with the Kazakh nobility would bring greater success (Vyatkin, 1940: 4-5; Vyatkin, 1947: 229, 245, 257).

However, even within the framework of the pre-Soviet historiographic direction «the forward movement of Russia», there was a tradition to blame all the failures of Russia's policy on the «short-sighted» and «faint-hearted frontier commanders». So, regarding the real subordination of the Kazakhs, the representatives of this direction considered «guilty» the border authorities.

And only the activity of the first governor of Orenburg, I. Neplyuev, was approved in the pre-revolutionary literature. V. Vitevsky on a large factual material showed the merits of the governor in the colonization of the Orenburg Territory and called him «Peter the Great of the Orenburg Territory» (Vitevsky, 189; Dobrosmyslov, 1900; Kraft, 1900).

I. Erofeeva connects with the name of I. Neplyuev «the beginning of the practical implementation of the colonial strategy of Russia in the Kazakh lands». In 1742 he was sent as the head of the Orenburg Commission. I. Erofeeva notes that he had a clear program of actions «from the very beginning he began to strictly and resolutely pursue a political course on the complete subordination of the Kazakh rulers to the state apparatus of the Russian Empire». In addition to building fortifications of the Orenburg line and erecting new frontier lines, building up the military-service contingent, I. Neplyuev set the task of subordinating the ruling elite of the Mladshii i Srednii Zhuz to the state apparatus of the Russian Empire 266 (Erofeeva, 1999: 259, 261). After meeting with Khan Abulhair and the influential starshinami of the three zhuzes on August 23, 1742, I. Neplyuev drew a line on his behavior towards the nomadic rulers of the region. The political concept was formulated in 1743: «It is very similar and more useful .. not to allow in the agreement among them (the Kazakh khans and sultans.-aut.)». According to I. Erofeeva, I. Neplyuev considered Abulhair as an extremely inconvenient figure for the realization of his tasks in the region (Erofeeva, 1999: 267). Their relations became extremely hostile, since I. Neplyuev would like to see a more docile person instead of the real leader Abulhair. Khan himself hoped to find support from the Russians in order to become the sole ruler in the steppe. In addition, he needed Russia's military support from the encroachments of the Dzungars and the Shah of Nadir (Erofeeva, 1999: 268).

Z.Kundakbayeva assumed that I.Neplyuev marked the beginning of the transition to the second stage of the region imperial integration. The content of the second stage was the «centering» of the controlled territory, when defenses were created around it, troops were deployed and a regional center of power was created. The main task was the establishment of military-administrative supervision over traditional institutions of power. Due to limited opportunities at this stage, it was not about administrative and social assimilation, violence and total annihilation of the population were also impossible. Therefore, the ethnocultural characteristics of

the population and sociocultural mosaic were preserved in the controlled territory. It was important to establish the optimal mode of interaction with local owners – the elite. In relations with it, the central authority balanced between two vectors. On the one hand, it was forced to strengthen those local owners on whom it relied. S. Kaspé wrote: «The Empire gives them additional stability in relations with rival local elite groups, in relations with subordinate populations». On the other hand, the empire must establish acceptable limits to the intensity of the competitive struggle of local owners, gradually limiting their power, subjecting them to general imperial interests (Kundakbayeva, 2005: 23). In the previous literature, much attention was paid to the activities of I. Neplyuev in submission of the Kazakh khan Abulhair to the Russian power and the consequences of the conflict and hostility between them, which led to a violation of stability in the region in 1743-1744 (Erofeeva, 1999: 259-317).

The monograph of Z. Kundakbayeva presents a new look at the activities of I. Neplyuev in maintaining ethnopolitical stability in the region (Kundakbayeva, 2005: 222-243). Meanwhile, both authors used as a primary sources documents from the central archives-AVPRI and RGIA. I. Erofeeva also refers to the funds of the regional archive – the Orenburg region.

In this article, on the basis of the new documents revealed in the Budgetary Institution of the Republic of Kalmykia «National Archive», attention is paid to a little-known period in the life of V.N. Tatishchev, when he was performing the Empress's mission – to ensure stability in the border zone during the war between Russia and Sweden.

Exactly, some aspects of the activity of V.N. Tatishchev when he was the head of the Kalmyk Commission 1741-1745 were studied. For example, N. Popov considered in detail how V.N. Tatishchev interacted with the governor of the Kalmyk Khanate, the widow of Donduk Ombo Khan Djan and other Kalmyk owners (Popov, 1861: 235-352). N.N. Palmov, on the basis of documents from the Astrakhan Provincial Archive, revealed certain aspects of the activity of V.N. Tatishchev as head of the Kalmyk Commission (Palmov, 1925: 201-216; Palmov, 1928: 317-342). Contemporary Russian historians, on the basis of the archival funds of the National Archives of the Republic of Kalmykia, considered the activities of V.N. Tatishchev to end the crisis in the Kalmyk Khanate (Dordzhieva, 1995; Batmaev, 1993; Kurapov, 2013; Suseyeva, 2016; Suseyeva, 2018; Toropitsyn, 2009). In general, it should be

noted that insufficient attention was paid to the relations between the Kazakhs and the Kalmyks during this period. Although N.N. Palmov paid attention to this issue and concluded that the relationship between the Kazakhs and Kalmyks is much broader than a one-sided interpretation within the framework of hostility (Palmov, 1927: 40). The modern Kalmyk researcher A. Tsyuryumov analyzes the correspondence between the governor of the Kalmyk Khanate Donduk-Dashi and the Kazakh khans and batyrs in the 1740s (Tsyuryumov, 2007: 275).

In the modern period, Western scholars appeal to such definitions of empires, which emphasize the lack of heterogeneity. For example, Ronald Suny developed the following definition: «The empire is a highly constructed state in which the metropolis dominates over the periphery, while the periphery perceives the policies and practices of the metropolis as «alien», and relations with it as unequal and exploitative. In addition to inequality and subordination, the relationship between the metropolis and the periphery is characterized by the presence of ethnic differences, geographical separation and administrative heterogeneity» (Suny in Bolshakova, 2003: 35). Alfred Rieber supplements this definition: «imperial states are based on conquests, their borders are not natural and cultural, but military frontiers» (Rieber in Bolshakova, 2003: 35). According to A. Rieber, the main reason for the «long viability of empires» was not so much in violence, but in the ability to spread the imperial idea, in the bureaucracy that supported the viability of the regime. And finally, A. Rieber considers the ability to control peripheral zones or frontiers as the main guarantee of the long existence of an empire (Rieber in Bolshakova, 2003: 43). At the same time, according to A. Rieber, the frontier in turn also influenced the imperial center, because in response to the resistance of peripheral peoples, the imperial governments had to negotiate, conclude agreements, change their policies, and even refuse any measures (Rieber in Bolshakova, 2003: 43). Meanwhile, the new documents found in the National Archives of the Republic of Kalmykia allow us to see how V.N. Tatishchev performed the tasks of ensuring stability in the border region. How did he regulate the relations of the Kalmyks with the Kazakhs? What tactics did he follow? What were the main results of his work in regulating the relations of Kazakhs and Kalmyks? The documents revealed in fund 36: «Consisting in Kalmyk affairs under the Astrakhan governor», allow us to answer these questions.

The main part

In the National Archives of the Republic of Kalmykia there are texts of two decrees to V. Tatishchev: from November 30, 1741 and from December 15, 1741. In the first decree it was recommended that V. Tatishchev ensured the arrival of several noble starshins from the Kazakhs and notable zaisangs from the governor of the Kalmyk khanate Donduk-Dashi to Orenburg, so that they would conclude a peace treaty. The second treaty allowed hung out such negotiations in Astrakhan. At the same time, V. Tatishchev was told that if the Kazakh envoys arrived with letters, to ensure and confirm peace between them between for 10 years or how much they would agree to, in the meantime, it was possible to take appropriate measures to prevent the free will from going through Yakik-river of the Kaisak and Kalmyk». If the emissary would be without letters, then to hand them such letters addressed to Abulhair and other elders and send them back (BURKNA, F. I-36. Op. 1. D. 141. L. 78-78ob.).

First of all, thanks to the decree of the Empress of December 15, 1741, we learn that V.N. Tatishchev was entrusted with a responsible mission – to control the raids of the Kazakhs and Kalmyks against each other, moreover, «the Kirghiz Kaisak people reconciled with the Kalmyk people, so that these two people could live in harmony». In addition, the fund contains texts of credentials to the Kazakh khans of the Mladshii and Srednii Zhuz from January 18, 1742. The credentials said: «Our Imperial Derogatory Approval is so that our Kirghiz Kaysak and Kalmyk peoples live among themselves without war and didn't attack one another, because from this there is no benefit for both nations except ruin».

The Astrakhan governor V.N. Tatishchev were entrusted to organize negotiations. The correspondence of V.N. Tatishchev with the Kazakh khans and sultans in 1741-1745 is also valuable for us. The tone of the letters, their style indicates the desire of V.N. Tatishchev to establish good relations not only with the Kazakh khans, but also with starshins and batyrs. So, in a letter to Dzhanybek V.N. Tatishchev did not skimp on the praise in his address (BURKNA, F. I-36. Op. 1. D. 141. L.75-75ob.). The content and tone of the letters from V.N. Tatishcheva to Bukenby Batyr and Iset Batyr of the Srednii Zhuz (BURKNA, F. I-36. Op. 1. D. 141. L. 76-76ob.). Thus the desire to establish good relations with the Kazakhs V.N. Tatishchev demonstrated through his friendly and warm letters. D. Suseeva analyzed the letters of V.N. Tatishchev to the Kazakh owners from the point of view of informational, linguistic

and communicative aspects and concluded that V.N. Tatishchev did a lot to strengthen the Russian state, to preserve peace and harmony between the Kazakhs and Kalmyks. As an example, D. Suseeva gave a letter to V.N. Tatishchev (by the rules of spelling and punctuation of that time) addressed to Abulhair Khan dated February 2, 1742, indicating the concreteness of the content of this letter, the conscious choice of the best language tools (lexical, grammatical, syntactic, stylistic) for a particular situation; about the exact observance of ethical standards of behavior (consideration of the social status and relations of the participants in communication, etc.). But V.N. Tatishchev demonstrated his desire to establish good relations with the Kazakhs not only through the choice of lexical means, but also reinforced this with concrete actions. So, in January 1742, he decreed the release of the three arrested Kazakhs who were detained in Astrakhan. V. Tatishchev decided to release them, so that «in the present cases, it must be shown pleasure for the firm reconciliation of the Kaisak people with the Kalmyk people.» (BURKNA, F. I-36. Op. 1. D. 141. L. 74). However, we learn from further correspondence of V. Tatishchev that it was from his side preparatory work to facilitate the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Kazakhs and the Kalmyks.

There are letters of V.N. Tatishchev to Abulhair in the fund. So, in a letter dated January 29, 1742 V.N. Tatishchev informed Abulhair about the envoys of the Khan of the Middle Zhuz Abulmamet, Sultan Barak and Batyr Dzhanybek to the Kalmyk Khan Dzhan with expressed intentions «with the Kalmyk people to live in harmony». V.N., Tatishchev in his letter suggested that Abulhair also send ambassadors to make peace with the Kalmyks, while notifying him that he was negotiating with the Kalmyk governor so that he would keep Kalmyks from raiding the Kazakhs. «If anyone was Kalmyk, who, though disgusted with the thieves, would do it,» said V.N. Tatishchev, – I ask you not to regard it as a violation of peace, immediately notify me through messengers here, according to which appropriate justice would be done», (BURKNA. F. I-36. Op. 1. D. 141. L. 79). But the nomads had their own customs and rituals for the conclusion of a peace treaty. Thus, a prerequisite, a symbol of peaceful intentions was the preliminary exchange of prisoners and the return of stolen cattle. Long years of stay among the nomads, did V.N. Tatishchev as an expert on steppe customs, therefore conducting preliminary negotiations with the nomadic elite to conclude a peace treaty, V.N. Tatishchev did not forget about this side of the issue. Instead of pressure and power

solutions, V.N. Tatishchev was characterized by a different manner of communication. So, he asked Abulkhair to help return to the Kalmyks captured in the summer of 1741 Kalmyk prisoners (27 baptized Kalmyks) as well as cattle (450 heads) (БҮР-КНА, Ф. И-36. Оп. 1. Д. 141. Л. 86-88). To return the cattle captured by the Kazakhs and prisoners, 15 people headed by Kalmyk Tsoirashi left Astrakhan. Although Batyr Dzhanybek promised the governor to assist in the search for prisoners and cattle, the case was not completed. Therefore, V.N. Tatishchev sent to the Kazakhs a new group of people from the Astrakhan from Yurt Tatars headed by Yusup Mullah and asked Abulkhair for help. The choice of a Muslim as a mediator, who understands and speaks Kazakh, testifies about careful attention of V.N. Tatishchev to the situation. At the same time, V.N. Tatishchev attached a postscript to the letter that he freed the captured Kazakhs and sent home at the request of the envoys of the starshins of the Srednii Zhuz (BURKNA. F. I-36. Op. 1. D. 141. L. 87ob.-88.).

It should be noted that the circle of respondents of V.N. Tatishchev from the Kazakhs was quite wide. Among them was the Khan of the Srednii Zhuz, Abulmamet and Barak-Sultan. In addition, V.N. Tatishchev appealed for assistance not only to Chingizids, but also to elders and batyrs, having correctly assessed the changes in the social hierarchy of the Kazakhs. Due to the fact that all the decrees and letters to Abulkhair remained unanswered, except for the Khan of the Srednii Zhuz Abulmamet, and also wanting to speed up the process of negotiation, V.N. Tatishchev decided to send Major Miller to the Kazakhs. The choice of this particular officer for the mission to the Kazakh ulus is explained by the fact that earlier V.N. Tatishchev, being the head of the Orenburg Commission, had already sent Major Miller with a diplomatic assignment to the khan of the Srednii Kazakh Zhuz, with whom he had coped (BURKNA. -F. I-36. -Op 1. -D. 141. -L. 442ob.).

So, as follows from the preceding historiography, as early as May 1742, Abulhair and Iset Batyr reported to the Orenburg Commission that they «made peace with the lower Kalmyks», «seeing that we are all in one's allegiance, we leave the war» Moreover, it was noted that when signing the peace «there were 40 people on both sides» (Kundakbayeva, 2005: 223).

But as follows from the archival finds, V.N. Tatishchev was not satisfied with this bilateral agreement, apparently concluded without his participation. Therefore, in June 1742, he asked the Orenburg

Commission to send Major Miller to negotiate with the Kazakh sultans and starshins «for the approval of the peace with the Kalmyks, and the search for a caravan». In a letter to Abulkhair Khan dated June 3, 1742, the Astrakhan governor stressed: The Kaisaks and the Kalmyks, without a genuine affirmation of the peace, have not begun to start offending among themselves». In this regard, V.N. Tatishchev asked the Kazakh Khan to make efforts to ensure that the Kazakh elders, in particular, Dzhaniybek and Iset, come to him without hesitation. Similar messages were sent by the Astrakhan governor to the Kazakh starshins (BURKNA. -F. I-36. -Op 1. -D. 141. -L. 444).

The Kazakh Khan, the sultans and starshins made peace with the Kalmyks not in accordance with the scenario of V.N. Tatishchev, but based on the steppe customs. This is evidenced by Abulhair's response to I. Neplyuev's request «and the Khan announced envoys to Astrakhan that a brother of sergeant-old Kashbaya had been sent, with whom they sent Kalmyk yasyri, and he stated himself rather that he would try to keep the people will argue. » (Kazakh-Russian relations in the XVI-XVIII centuries ...: 236-237). Other starshins acted in this way. They sent their representatives to the Kalmyk uluses, but refused to come themselves to endorse a peace treaty with the Kalmyk nobility.

Although the Kazakh Khan, the sultans and starshins made peace with the Kalmyks not in accordance with the scenario of V.N. Tatishcheva, but based on the steppe customs, however it was the results of the tremendous efforts of V.N. Tatishchev. Nevertheless, although the Kazakh Khan, the sultans and starshins did not fully obey V.N. Tatishchev, his efforts were not in vain. The main result was that he managed to keep the Kazakhs and Kalmyks away from mutual raids at least for a while. Given the wartime, it was important to ensure control over the border zone, which was not equipped with fortifications, without military force. As the further development of events showed, the actions of I. Neplyuev, who were characterized by tough, forceful methods in interaction with the nomadic elite, led to the disobedience of Abulkhair. And the period of 1743-1744 was characterized by large raids of the Kazakh Khan on Russian fortifications and on neighboring Kalmyks. Moreover, the threat of falling out of the Kazakhs from the zone of imperial communication was created. The stability of the border region has been broken. Regular military units were not enough. The result was that the situation demanded a lot of attention from both central and local governments.

The work was carried out as part of the strategic project «Kalmykia as a cross-border region in the eastern vector of Russia», implemented as part of the development program of B.B. Gorodovikov Kalmyk State University, as basic regional university and

supported by the intra-university grant 2019 No. 1094 «Russian-Kalmyk-Kazakh Relations» (based on the documents of the Kalmyk Commission stored in the National Archive of the Republic of Kalmykia, when it was the head of V.N. Tatischev)).

References

- Batmaev M.M. (1993). *Kalmyki v XVII – XVIII vekah. Sobytiya, lyudi, byt* [Kalmyks in XVII-XVIII c. Events. People. Life]. M.M. Batmaev. Elista: Kalmyckoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo. 381 p.
- Bol'shakova O. (2003). *Rossiiskaya imperiya: sistema upravleniya. Sovremennaya zarubezhnaya istoriografiya. Analiticheskiy obzor* [Russian Empire: ruling system. Modern foreign historiography. Analytical digest] Moskva: INION. 92 p.
- Cyuryumov A.V. (2007). *Kalmyckoe hanstvo v sostave Rossii: problemy politicheskikh vzaimootnoshenii* [The Kalmyk Khanate in the composition of Russia: political relations problems]. Elista. 464 p.
- Cyuryumov A.V. (2007). *Kalmyckoe hanstvo v sostave Rossii: problemy politicheskikh vzaimootnoshenii* [The Kalmyk khanate in composition of Russia: problems of political relations]. Elista: ZAOr «NPP «Dzhangar».
- Dobrosmyslov A. I. (1900). *Turgaiskaya oblast'* [The Turgai region]. Orenburg. 282 p.
- Dordzhieva G.SH. (1995). *Buddizm i hristianstvo v Kalmykii. Opyt analiza religioznoi politiki pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi imperii (seredina XVII – nachalo XX vv.)* [Buddhism and Christianity in Kalmykia. Testing of the Russian Empire's religious policy analysis (mid XVII – early XX centuries)]. Elista: Dzhangar. 128 p.
- Erofeeva I.V. (1999). *Han Abulhair: polkovodec, pravitel', politik* [Abulkhair Khan: Military Commander, Governor, Statesman]. Almaty: Sanat. 336 p.
- Gokhberg L., Kuznetsova T. (2011). *Strategiya-2020: novye kontury rossiiskoi innovatsionnoi politiki* [Strategy 2020: New Outlines of Innovation Policy]. Foresight-Russia, vol. 5, no 4, pp. 8–30.
- Kraft I. I. (1900). *Prinyatie kirgizami rossiiskogo poddanstva* [Acceptance of Russian rule by the Kyrgyzs]. Orenburg. 60 p.
- Kundakbaeva, Zh.B. (2005). «Znakom milosti E.I.V.» *Rossiya i narody Severnogo Prikaspiya v XVIII veke. Seriya «AIRO-monografiya»* [As a Mark of the His Imperial Majesty's favor. Russia and Northern Caspian peoples in XVIII c.]. Zh.B. Kundakbaeva. Moskva: AIRO-HKHI; Sankt-Petersburg: Dmitriy Bulanin. 2005. 303 p.
- Kurapov A.A. (2013). *V.N. Tatischev i buddiiskaya obshchina Kalmyckogo hanstva v 40-e gg. XVIII v.: specifika politicheskogo vzaimodeistviya* [V.N. Tatischev and the Buddhist community of the Kalmyk Khanate in the 40s. XVIII century: specificity of political interaction]. *Desyatye Tatischevskie chteniya: materialy Vserossiiskoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferencii (Ekaterinburg, 20-21 noyabrya 2013 goda)*. Ekaterinburg: UMC UPI .P. 20-25.
- Kurapov A.A. (2017). *Specifika vzaimodeistviya astrahanskikh gubernatorov s buddiiskoi cerkov'yu Kalmyckogo hanstva v XVIII v.* [Specific of relations the Astrakhan Governors with the XVIII c. Kalmyk Khanate's Buddha Church]. *Bulletin of Kalmyk university scientific journal*, no36 (4), pp.24-32.
- Pal'mov N.N. (1925). *K Astrahanskomu period zhizni V.N. Tatischeva* [Of the Astrakhan period in V.N. Tatischev's life]. *Izvestiya Rossiiskoi akademii nauk* [Proceedings of the Russian Academy of Sciences]. VI series, vol. 19, no 6-8, pp. 201-216
- Pal'mov N.N. (1928). *K Astrahanskomu period zhizni V.N. Tatischeva* [Of the Astrakhan period in V.N. Tatischev's life]. *Izvestiya akademii nauk SSSR* [Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR]. VII series, no. 4-7, pp. 317-342.
- Pal'mov N.N. (1927). *Etyudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov* [Sketches on the Kalmyks history]. Part II. XVIII century. *As-trahan'*: Kalmoblizdat. 231 p.
- Popov N. (1861). *V.N. Tatischev i ego vremya* [V.N. Tatischev and his time]. Moskva, 1861, pp. 235–352.
- Riber A. (2001). *From reform to empire: Russia's «new» political history*. *Kritika*, vol.2 no2, pp.261-268.
- Riber A. (2002). *Approaches to empire*. *Ot mira imperii k globalizacii*. Saratov. P.117-138.
- Suny R. (2001). *Imperiya kak ona est': imperskaya Rossiya, nacional'noe samosoznanie i teorii imperii* [Empire how it is: Imperial Russia, national consciousness and theories of Empire]. *Ab Imperio*, no1-2, pp.9-71.
- Suseeva D.A. (2016). «Dlya postroeniya onoi krepostcy zaugodnye mesta usmotreny mezh Astrahani i Chernogo Yara». *V.N. Tatischev i Enotaevskaya krepost' v russko-kalmyckikh otnosheniyah. 1742-1745 gg.* [«For the construction of this, the feudal land-owners are seen between Astrakhan and Black Yar». V.N. Tatischev and Enotaevskaya fortress in the Russian-Kalmyk relations. 1742-1745]. *Istoricheskii arhiv*, pp. 185-190.
- Suseeva D.A. (2018). *V.N. Tatischev kak glava Kalmyckoi komissii* [V.N. Tatischev as the head of the Kalmyk Commission]. *Vostochnyi arhiv*. Moskva: Institut vostokovedeniya RAN, no 1(37), pp. 4–7.
- Toropicyn I.V. (2009). *Oborona kalmyckikh ulusov v 30–40-h gg. XVIII v.* [The defense of the Kalmyk uluses in the 30s – 40s. XVIII century]. *Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferencii «Edinaya Kalmykiya v edinoi Rossii: cherez veka v budushchee»*, posvyashchennoi 400-letiyu dobrovol'nogo vkhozhdeniya kalmyckogo naroda v sostav Rossiiskogo gosudarstva (g. Elista, 13–18 sentyabrya 2009 g.). *V dvuh chastyakh. CHast' 1*. Elista: ZAOr «NPP «Dzhangar». P. 242–246.
- Vitevskii V. N. (1897). *I. I. Neplyuev i Orenburgskii kraj v prezhnem ego sostave do 1758 g.* [I.Neplyuev and the Orenburg region in past conditions until 1758]. *Kazan'*: Tipolitogr. V.M. Klyuchnikova 580 p.
- Vyatkin M. P. (1940). *Politicheskii krizis i hozyaistvennyi upadok v Maloi Orde v konce XVIII – nachale XIX vv.* [Political crisis and decline in Malaya Orda, the end of XVIII – the beginning of XIX cc.]. *Materialy po istorii Kazahskoi SSR. T.IV: (1785 – 1828 gg.)*. Pod red. M. Vyatkin. – Moskva-Leningrad, 1940. Tom 4. P.3-39.
- Vyatkin M. P. (1947). *Batyr Srym* [Srym Batyr]. Moskva-Leningrad, 392 p.