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**PROCESSES OF DISINTEGRATION AND THE CRISIS
OF CIVILIZATION IN THE TURKIC WORLD
(16-th – 19-th centuries)**

Scantly explored problem of crisis and disintegration in the Turkic world of late medieval period is studied in the article. It is necessary to indicate the climatic, economic, geopolitical and other factors of the disintegration of cultural and civilizational space of the Turks to the new time. As a part of the Muslim East, the Turkic world of Eurasia lagged behind in civilization development compared the European countries. The characteristic features of Turkic history of late medieval period are the growth of internal military conflicts, frequent migrations, decline of the economy, increasing disintegration of the Turkic civilization system and isolation of previous connected ethnic communities. There was deep crisis and decline of Eurasian nomadism in a new era. It is determined that Russia and China pursued expansionist policies and supported ethnic separatism of Turkic peoples. Despite present attempts of some scholars to explain Russian colonialism through Frontier Thesis of F.Terner, the policy of Tsarism in the East had serious differences and was reactionary. So mass uprisings against tsarism broke out in the territory of Kazakhstan and other parts of Turkic Eurasia. The authors consider that at the same time the formation of separate ethnic groups and national languages in the late Turkic history partly reflected objective challenges and trends of Global history. In Kazakh historical memory one can see evidences in favor of common Turkic identity.

Key words: Turkic world, ethnic consciousness, civilization, crisis, «black death», the decline of the Silk Road, military and political potential of East and West, reduction of nomadism, geopolitical situation in Central Eurasia, consequences of the colonial expansion of Russia, common historical memory of Turkic peoples.

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**Түркі әлеміндегі ыдырау мен өркениеттік дағдарыс үдерісі
(XVI-XIX ғғ.)**

Мақалада аз зерттелген түркі әлеміндегі кейінгі ортағасыр дәуірінен басталған дағдарыс пен ыдырау проблемасы қарастырылады. Түркілердің бірыңғай мәдени-өркениеттік кеңістігінің жаңа заманда ыдырауының себептері арасында табиғи-климаттық, экономикалық, геосаяси, т.б. бірқатар факторларды атау керек. Мұсылман әлемінің бір бөлігі ретінде түркі әлемі еуропалық елдермен салыстырғанда өркениеттік дамуында артта қала бастады. Кейінгі ортағасыр дәуіріндегі түркі әлемінде ішкі қақтығыстар мен миграциялардың жиілеуі, экономикалық дағдарыс, түркі өркениеттік жүйесінің ыдырауы мен бұдан бұрын өзара байланыста болып келген түркі халықтарының окшаулануы белгілері байқалады. Жаңа заманға қарай еуразиялық номадизм терең дағдарыс пен құлдылауды басынан кешіреді. Ресей мен Қытай экспансионистік саясат жүргізіп, әрі түркілер арасында этникалық бөлшектенуді қолдап отырғаны негізделеді. Кейбір ғалымдар тарапынан Ресей отаршылдығын Ф. Тернердің «фронтир» (шекара) теориясымен түсіндіруге тырысушылық болғанымен патша өкіметінің Шығыстағы саясаты түбегейлі өзгеше

және кертартпалық сипатта көрініс берді. Сондықтан Қазақстан және басқа түркі Еуразия аймақтарында патшалыққа қарсы үнемі халық көтерілістері болып отырды. Авторлар түркі әлемінде дербес этностар мен ұлттық тілдердің қалыптасуына бір жағынан дүниежүзілік объективтік сұраныстар мен үрдістердің көрсеткіші ретінде де қарайды. Қазақ халқының тарихи жадында ортақ түркі бірегейлігі туралы айғақтар табуға болады.

Түйін сөздер: түркі әлемі, этникалық сана-сезім, өркениет, дағдарыс, оба індеті, Ұлы Жібек жолының құлдырауы, Шығыс пен Батыстың әскери-саяси әлеуметі, номадизмнің әлсіреуі, Орталық Еуразиядағы геосаяси жағдай, Ресейдің отарлық экспансиясының салдары, түркі халықтарының ортақ тарихи жады.

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Процессы дезинтеграции и цивилизационного кризиса в тюркском мире (XVI-XIX вв.)

В статье исследуется малоизученная проблема кризиса и дезинтеграции в тюркском мире позднесредневекового периода. Следует определить множество факторов дезинтеграции единого культурно-цивилизационного пространства тюрков к новому времени, как природно-климатический, экономический, геополитический и др. Как часть мусульманского Востока тюркский мир начал отставать в цивилизационном развитии в сравнении с европейскими странами. Характерными чертами позднесредневековой истории тюркского мира выступают рост внутренних конфликтов, частые миграции, упадок экономики, усиление распада тюркской цивилизационной системы и обособления ранее взаимосвязанных тюркских этносов. Наблюдается глубокий кризис и упадок евразийского номадизма в новое время. Определяется, что Россия и Китай проводили экспансионистскую политику и поддерживали этнический сепаратизм среди тюркских народов. Несмотря на попытки некоторых ученых объяснить русский колониализм при помощи теории фронта Ф.Тернера, политика царизма на Востоке имела существенные отличия и носила реакционный характер. Поэтому вспыхивали массовые восстания против царизма на территории Казахстана и других частях тюркской Евразии. Авторы считают, что вместе с тем формирование в тюркском мире отдельных этносов и национальных языков отчасти отражало объективные вызовы и тенденции глобальной истории. В исторической памяти казахов можно найти свидетельства в пользу общей тюркской идентичности.

Ключевые слова: тюркский мир, этническое самосознание, цивилизация, кризис, «черная смерть», упадок Великого Шелкового пути, военно-политический потенциал Востока и Запада, ослабление номадизма, геополитическая ситуация в Центральной Евразии, последствия колониальной экспансии России, общая историческая память тюркских народов.

Introduction

Neither the classical works of the Orientalists or Turkologists, nor the modern literature on the history of the Turkic peoples, gives sufficient attention to this crisis that shattered a single cultural and civilizational space stretching from Siberia and the Altai to the Black Sea. The crisis of disintegration in the Turkic world remains largely unstudied. The authors of scientific papers do not seek to analyze the factors and circumstances that led to the cultural assimilation of the Turks or their dependence on external civilizational forces such as Russia and China. So far, each of the Turkic republics has focused only on their own narrow, national history, with little attention given to global processes or the dynamics of global history.

In general, major works on the history and culture of the Turkic peoples are lacking. The focus of the literature is either the ancient and early medieval periods (i.e. that era in which the Turkic world retained a common cultural basis) or certain narrow phenomenon in the history of the early twentieth century, usually associated with the spread of Pan-Turkism or the activities of intellectuals. The general or common history of the Turkic world of the late XVI – XIX centuries is reflected only weakly and contradictorily in textbooks and joint research. What is needed is a broader, civilizational approach that will examine the origins of the fracture and crisis of Turkic civilization in Eurasia and of each of its constituent peoples, as well as their permanent struggle for cultural and political survival.

Methods of research

In the modern understanding, progress is not simply a linear process but one with cycles of organization and disorganization; it does not preclude temporary phases of regression or deterioration. The history of the Turkic world and the development of Turkic culture and civilization should be understood in view of this paradigm. Emerging from ancient processes of growth and self-development, Turkic civilization at this particular point in history, from the late Middle Ages on, was, in our view, beginning to decline and stagnate. The characteristic feature of its cultural history in this period is differentiation, fragmentation and the formation of local Turkic cultures and ethnic communities. Also in our vision, in the modern and contemporary period the Turkic world was an organic part of the Muslim East.

The main part

The realities of Eurasian and world history changed dramatically with the end of the medieval era and the beginning of the modern period in the XVI-XVIIth centuries. A landmark event was the collapse of the Golden Horde. «This was the last powerful imperial nomadic confederation and the last to shape Eurasian history as a whole... Despite the relative weakness of this passionate drive for Europe, its influence was felt in the East. The East at the beginning of the modern era was impacted by two forces – that of Europe, in the form of the first steps of colonial expansion, and that of the steppes, in the form of the ongoing movements and development of nomadic tribes. Europe's influence was manifested in active colonial penetration and the establishment of trade relations. Despite this, the traditional structure of the East had not undergone major changes. «From XV to the XIX century, there was a kind of inertia, in which traditional laws continued to operate...» (Artykbaev, 2006:141).

In fact, the global world-system had already shifted tangibly in favor of the primacy of the Western community of nations by the middle of the XV century, a result of its having taken the path of industrial development, and in the XVI-XVIII centuries, owing to the hegemonic growth of capitalism into a veritable global (Kradin, 2007:96). Economic decline in Central Asia was clearly manifested in connection with the most important event in world history – the eclipse of the Silk Road as merchants began to turn away from the ancient caravan route through Central Asia in favor of the cheaper and safer sea route to the East. This global

imbalance began in the Age of Discovery (XV). The young bourgeoisie of European countries gained access to the markets of Eastern countries owing to the brilliant discoveries of navigators and to technical innovations, above all modern firearms. «Due to global geo-economic changes the flow of goods from the European part of Eurasia to the Middle East intensified while the traditional land routes of the Silk Road and other trade routes weakened; the influx of new industrial and handicraft products and technologies to nomadic regions was reduced to a minimum» (The History of Kazakhstan, 2000: 110).

As we analyze the underlying factors of this unprecedented crisis, the isolation and marginalization of Turkic Central Asia, it is necessary to seriously consider such problems as natural and environmental factors (climate change in Eurasia), increased starvation, migration, and finally, the pandemic plague in Eurasia – the «black death», against which ancient man had little or no defense. The plague that swept across Europe and Asia in the middle of the XIV century (1346-1353) was devastating and had disastrous consequences, claiming the lives of tens of millions of people in different parts of the continent. The nidus of this terrible infection from China and Mongolia spread westward with the Mongolian armies and trade caravans. Modern science recognizes that the plague had a huge impact on world history, affecting economics, psychology, culture, and demography (Hays, 2005:47). Large cities and sedentary civilizations were severely impacted by the outbreaks of the disease; they had a less devastating effect on the nomads owing to their natural dispersion and mobility.

The consequences of the plague directly and seriously impacted the Golden Horde, in which the decline in population led to political instability, as well as technological and cultural retrogression; it also paralyzed international trade. The natural phenomenon of the plague set the stage for the subsequent crisis. In general, the decline of the Silk Road was the beginning of decline in Central Asia. Strife and conflict spread throughout previously unified Turkic states in the region, including the Golden Horde and the Empire of Amir Timur, in the XVI-XVII centuries.

A complex set of factors, both internal and external, gradually and negatively impacted consciousness, culture, education, religion, art, etc. The poor quality of the late medieval Muslim education system, for example, stood in sharp contrast to earlier Islamic madrassahs; their intellectual level dropped significantly, and bigotry,

intolerance of dissent, and a disregard for science and knowledge intensified in the mentality of the average Muslim.

It was not by chance that Western European or Russian travelers and experts were unable to travel in the open and often had to disguise themselves as persons of Muslim origin (e.g. the great Hungarian scientist and orientalist Armin Vambery and Chokan Valikhanov, a Kazakh scholar who served as an intelligence officer in the Imperial army) in Bukhara and Kashgar in the XVIII-XIX centuries, owing to the non-compliance of these states with diplomatic norms and international protocols, as well as to escalating religious fanaticism.

The civilizational and ideological history of Central Asia from the XVI century on is marked by the sharp split between and growing conflict among Sunnis and Shiites, the cause of which is mainly attributed to the policies of the Safavid shahs of Iran, who made the Shia faith their state religion (Barthold, 1971:173). The main rival of Shiite Iran under the «Qyzylbash» was the Ottoman sultanate, whose leasers were «orthodox Sunni.» This fact resulted in the even deeper isolation of Muslims in Central Asia. Sunni Turkestan and Shiite Iran formed a wall of religious estrangement, a sectarian barrier that halted the exchange of cultural values, ideas, and communication among spiritual and religious elites. In this way, the heart or center of Central Asia was also cut off from Afghanistan and India.

Islam lost its original spirit of dynamism and creativity as a result (Yikbal, 2002:143). Intellectual stagnation had a direct impact on the state of science, including the natural sciences and engineering, medicine, industry, etc. The Muslim East, including the Turkic world, began to lag behind the West and Russia in the types and quality of weapons and in military affairs (the Ottoman Empire and the Moghul Empire of Babur are exceptions to this). As for the Eurasian nomads, the nomadic Kazakhs, their military and political potential and global reach were inadequate in the XVI-XVIII centuries; they were unfamiliar with artillery and rifles were a rarity in the steppe.

It is clear that the crisis in the system of science, education and technology in the Turkic lands was directly related to the crisis in the main centers of the Islamic world (in places such as Cairo and Baghdad). If Central Asia in the pre-Mongol period developed together with the general Muslim Renaissance of the IX-XI centuries and produced luminaries such as Abunahr Muhammad Al Farabi, Aburayhan Biruni, Abu Ali Ibn Sina, Omar Khayyam, among others,

in the late Middle Ages and modern period there was a growing decline and deterioration in science and the fine arts. This phenomenon had not only a local cause and causal framework but was also rooted in broader civilizational forces, as the Turkic world had long been an integral part of a far broader Islamic heritage. Many aspects of the history of Turkic culture and civilization should be viewed in the context of a larger problem – the competition and struggle between East and West, between Islam and the communities of western Europe.

Noting the objective factors (in this case climatic, biological, demographic factors, etc.) limiting the development of Turkic culture and civilization as a whole in the modern period, we should not gloss over external political factors: the aggressive designs of the European powers, and the pernicious ideas of their young bourgeoisie, who in pursuit of profit drove their countries to conquer weaker areas of the East in the interest of global expansion.

For Turkic history, given that the majority of its ethnic groups were located in Eurasia, we must emphasize the devastating economic, political and cultural consequences of the colonial expansion of the Russian empire, and the policies of the Qing (China) imperium, under whose authority expansive areas of indigenous Turkic lands were seized in the XVIII and early XX centuries. From the end of the XV-XVI centuries, the growing strength of Moscow and its aggressive Eastern policies splintered the unity of the Golden Horde, paving the way for the capture of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia, and allowing its military to penetrate Kazakh lands.

This was accompanied by a policy of «divide and rule.» Moscow sowed ethnic discord between peoples once united in the Turkic world. In the late Middle Ages there began to emerge from a single mass of Turkic tribes several, more discrete groupings: the Nogai Horde in the west and the Uzbek nomadic confederation in the central steppes of Eurasia. Parts of the Turkic Nogai were closely linked with the west, their nomadic incursions reaching up to the Dniester. Among the Kazakhs, the Nogai and Tatar intensified political divisions, fueled in part by objective socio-economic realities that Moscow consciously manipulated. At the beginning of the XVI century two powers competed in Kazan – the pro-Crimea and pro-Russian; as the Kazakh historian M. Tynyshbaev has written, «with such severe internal troubles it was not difficult for Ivan IV to take Kazan and finally attach it to Russia» (Tynishbaev, 1993:135). The same forces, those that were either pro-Moscow or pro-Crimea, competed in the Astrakhan Khanate.

As for the Nogai, the words Ismail Mirza uttered to his rival brother, Yusuf, are characteristic: «Your people go to trade in Bukhara. And my people go to Moscow» (Trepavlov, 2001:523). This struggle took on a violent character, and as a result, at the urging of Moscow, Ismail killed Ismail and unleashed a brutal massacre in his lands. A part of the Nogai fled to the Kazakh khan Haqq-Nazar. Throughout the XVII-XVIII centuries tribalism and fragmentation steadily grew within the ruling Juchid dynastic lines in Kazakhstan. It is sufficient to recall the adoption of Russian citizenship by the junior or little Zhuz, a historical moment in which the Russian Ambassador Alexander Tevkelev observed the warring of two factions in the Kazakh horde: that of Abulkhair Khan's fighting in favor of the Russian protectorate against a grouping of opposed sultans and elders. (Kazakhsko-Russkie otnoshenia v XVIII-XIX vekah 1964:57).

Under the Russian Empire, the Turkic peoples reached a level of material decline, cultural stagnation, and fragmentation in language, religion, and education that was unprecedented in scope. A number of small Turkic ethnic groups in the Siberia and Altai were completely and irreversibly assimilated both linguistically and ethnically or their lands depopulated. In addition to the economic plunder of their lands, the Yakut (Sakha), Khakass, and others endured profound spiritual and cultural oppression, manifested in enforced baptisms and the forced adoption of Russian personal names and surnames. Beyond this, the metropolis deliberately spread alcohol in these distant lands, a proven tactic in placating indigenous populations in various colonial lands. This was intended to demoralize and completely enfeeble the population in order to facilitate the liberation of territories rich in natural resources.

Of course, the integration of the Turks of the Volga-Ural region, Siberia, the Altai, Turkestan, the Caucasus, North Caucasus, and the Crimea to the growing multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Russian Empire should be treated as a complex and ambiguous historical process with diverse phases that unfolded in line with the global drama of centuries of interaction between East and West and the regularities of the global capitalist economic system. We also have to consider that for many centuries and millennia there was a natural and logical process of ethnic splintering, transformation, stages of ethnic disintegration and re-consolidation, and shifting ethnic markers and identities in these ethnic histories (Lurye, 1997). However, the negative impact of Tsarist rule on Turkic history

is undeniable and obvious, as is its deep ethnic and cultural fragmentation under Russian rule, the evidence of which is replete in the history of nearly every nation in the period of Russia's domination.

So, examining the growing political and cultural disintegration of a single Turco-Islamic space throughout the XVI-XVIII centuries, the state of the Golden Horde, with its center on the lower Volga, disintegrated in the space of 30-70 years in the XV century, this painful process due to its «fragmentation» into smaller Turkic states and khanates in Eurasia such as the Crimean Khanate, the Khanate of Kazan, the Astrakhan Khanate, the Siberian or Tyumen Khanate, the Kazakh Khanate (with links to the Ak Orda or the state of the «Uzbek» nomads), the Nogai Horde (Mangytsky Yurt), and others.

The tragedy of late medieval Turkic history began with the Russian conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan, Isker, the liquidation of indigenous state functions in these areas and the accompanying massacres, vandalism, looting, and forced conversions to Christianity. The entirety of the male population was slaughtered with the capture of Kazan, and the Russian tsar placed its women at the disposal of his soldiers. «The city presented a horrible sight: blazing fires, looted houses, streets littered with corpses, blood flows everywhere;» «the immoral slaughter of the residents of Kazan after its capture is one of the worst pages in Russian history» (Khudyakov, 1923/1996:644).

By the end of the XVI century, the entirety of the middle and lower Volga, and the territory of the former Siberian Khanate Kuchum had been brought under Russia dominion. At the beginning of the XVII century Russia ended the political significance of the Turkic Nogai, and was encroaching on the borders of the Kazakh Khanate (which had existed from the 70s of the XV century).

The withdrawal from the historical arena of the powerful Turkic state – the Empire of Amir Timur and his descendants, the Timurids, was the second most important factor after the collapse of the Golden Horde on the negative trajectory of Turkic Eurasian history. Processes of decay and disintegration, the weakening of local religious and political elites, prevailed throughout Turkic Eurasia with its disappearance. As a result, the passionate energy that had created the growth and prosperity of a single, cohesive Turkic civilization was dissipated in rivalries and bloody feuds; the remaining, fragmented Turkic political entities were unable to withstand the onslaught of their civilizational rivals.

If in the ancient and medieval era processes of decay were temporary and alternated with strong resurgences (following the decline of the Great Turkic khaganate the Karakhanids and Seljuks, after the crisis of pre-Mongol era, the emergence of the Kipchak Turkic state of the Golden Horde, etc.), in the period from the end of the XV to XIX century any hope for the restoration of Turkic unity was lost: the force of decay and isolation was compounded by the incredible momentum and aggressive approach of powerful neighboring empires, and by the sharp increase in the military and technical potential of the Christian and European West.

«Of all the ethnic and political formations the Juchids of the post-Golden Horde period outlasted all the states of the Kazakh sultans and the Crimean Khanate. The end of the dynastic power in the Crimea of the Girey came in 1783 with the incorporation of the Crimea into the Russian Empire. Russian acquisition of Kazakh lands, a process which began in the 30s of the XVIII century and that for various reasons was delayed for decades, ended only in the 60's of the XIX century.» (Tynishbaev M. 1993: p. 178). With Russia's geopolitical gains, the development of a new system of economic relations hit the Turkic peoples living at the frontier of civilization, on the border of major powers, and disputed territories particularly hard. This applies to the Nogai, the Crimeans, Kazakhs, Tatars, Bashkir, and Uighurs.

In the first quarter of the XVIII century an unprecedented geopolitical situation emerged in Central Asia. In the XVIII century the Kazakhs were the most numerous Turkic ethnic group in Eurasia with 2.3 million people and had the potential and the best chance to integrate into modern civilization. Instead, its people became embroiled in many centuries in the hellish cultural experiments of the Russian Empire, though the most extreme of their cruelty and cynicism were achieved only after the communist takeover.

The historical background of the Kazakh-Russian political conflict has been outlined by local scholars (in the chapter «The political situation in Kazakhstan in the first third of the XVIII century,» of the academic edition of the 'History of Kazakhstan from ancient times to the present day', vol.3) who sketch a «worsening socio-economic and political situation in the south-east of Russia and in the Central Asian countries due to shifts in world trade and communications with the continent in the Atlantic basin and the intensive military and political expansion of the Russian state into the south-east of Europe and Siberia, and that of the Qing Empire

into Central Asia. The incursion into Eurasia of these imperial systems of government into Eurasia unfolded against a background of the gradual loss of the cultural and historical contacts between the nomads and the East and West; there was a gradual displacement of nomadic peoples along trade routes, the reduction of nomadism in Eurasia, and the disruption of traditional, nomadic migration routes and movements. These geopolitical developments resulted in the intensification of conflicts between nomadic peoples for pasturages and easy access to markets in nearby territories. On this basis, a new round of military confrontation in the international sphere stretched over the first third of the XVIII century and engulfed all those lands south of the Volga region, Western Siberia, as well as adjacent regions of Central Asia» (Istoria Kazakstana, 2000:10).

In the textbook 'The History of Kazakhstan and Central Asia' its authors raise the point that the growth of the Russian Empire reflected the historical pattern of expansion and transformation of large centralized settled and agricultural states and empires through the development of peripheral areas inhabited by nomads and other mobile populations. It is noted that Russia brought to the indigenous inhabitants of Central Asia «the idea of a centralized state, to which the latter opposed traditional ethnic, cultural, and religious values. Firearms and regular armies confronted indigenous peoples across the whole of Eurasia, Africa and the Americas who fought back with bows, arrows, and at best with cavalry armed with piercing and slashing weapons against modern forms of warfare, strategy and tactics; guerrilla warfare opposed centralized management and rigidly organized communication and management structures...» (Istoria Kazakstana i Tsentralnoi Azii, 2001:353).

There is a tendency to remove subjectivity and the human aspect from interpretations of history (the right to choose, the will and the mind of man, which is exactly what distinguishes a human story from a blind, indiscriminate natural process and that imbues it with moral sense), and with it the moral responsibility of nations and states to one another, which, incidentally, should increase in proportion to the natural «development» of humanity. At present Russian history is actively refashioning theories to make their colonial conquests fit more modern conceptions, in particular, the theory of the frontier. Kazakh professor G. Kokebaeva has noted the inconsistency of this theory with respect to the frontier of the Russian Empire (Kokebaeva, 2012). She concludes that the theory of «new land» and

promoting the «natural boundaries» of an empire contradict the idea of a state among the nations, and of developing colonized, territorial Russian lands; it is no surprise that a group of Siberian researchers engaged in a comparative study of the American and Russian frontiers believe that the Kazakh Khanate was not a real state, «Kazakh khans were in fact military commanders and leaders, not rulers of an actual state» (Kokebaeva, 2012:116).

Overall, it is probably advisable to interpret history as the sum of objective and subjective factors, to take a sensible approach to the laws of human evolution, viewing it as a complex, interconnected anthropological system, and to the moral responsibility of communities, without compromising the will of political elites and ideologues. In fact, if you go back to the idea a centralized state exports, advanced social organization, etc., then the people of the East, including the nomads of the steppes of Eurasia (in contrast to the American Indians or Eskimos of North Asia), often generated these ideas and models in their histories and implement them. To claim that Russia introduced the idea of statehood to the Turks in place of tribalism is to be dishonest. In the history of the Eurasian expanse space there were several such organized under the banners of the Turks and Mongols themselves.

As for tribalism, as is noted in the work of the well-known Western scholar of the nomads, A. Khazanov, one needs to distinguish between «primitive» and secondary (or political) tribalism; more complex nomadic political associations were latent, or inherent, in what he terms secondary, or «marginal» tribalism (Khazanov, 1984:151). Among the later Kazakh nomads tribalism was secondary; a tribe or juz was not so much an ethno-linguistic community but rather a mobile military-political entity that under favorable historical circumstances quickly integrated into a unified state system, which indicates a higher level of sociopolitical organization. Of course, the realities changed in the modern epoch, the Turkic peoples splintered and weakened and needed to reunite. Yet it must be remembered that this very disintegration was largely the result of years of subversive «work» by growing empires – Russia and China, who in various ways, both direct and indirect, undermined the foundations of the indigenous peoples' natural unity.

So-called «Muslim fanaticism» or the later «predatory» actions of the nomadic Kazakhs (or similarly of nomadic Uzbeks, Turkmens, etc.) that increased military conflicts in the region (including among new ethnic formations of Turkic peoples,

and between tribes, clans, etc.) were actually caused by external pressures. Thus, it is well known that without access to trade nomads resorted to desperate raids, the confiscation of goods, and to hostile demands for the opening of markets, etc.

Growth of conflicts in Central Asia in the XVII-XIX centuries was deeply and objectively rooted in the rise and encroachment of the Great Powers, which resulted in widespread impoverishment and forced mass migrations. The seizure of pasturages by Russian authorities inevitably led to conflicts and disputes with neighboring and related nations and peoples. The notorious «laziness» or «rudeness» of the nomads or Muslim communities, their lack of hygiene, etc., were not some eternal ethnic trait but resulted from centuries of poverty, migrations, and wars, and which any nation would exhibit if it were in a state of moral crisis or degeneration.

A striking example of the «historically acquired» hostility among Bashkirs and Kazakhs. The mutual and unremitting nature of their raiding in the modern period is a result of the expansionist policy of Russia and the skillful diplomacy of the Empire in pitting one small people against other. In fact, as the Kazakh historian and poet Shahkarim Kudaiberdi-uly pointed out, the Bashkir were among those ethnic groups most closely related to the Kazakhs, as indicated by their common Kipchak roots and shared ethnic characteristics (Qydayberdi-uly, 2007:192). The great powers Russia and China made great efforts to deepen conflict between the two major warring ethnic groups of Eurasia – the Kazakhs and Mongol Oirats – until it turned into a large-scale, protracted, and exhausting war of mutual destruction.

However, speaking of subjective, political factors, and of the responsibility ruling indigenous elites, we must recognize that local leaders as well as what might be termed the «nobility of the white bone,» those of the ruling elite who could trace their descent through Chingiz Khan, played in the support and growth of ethnic separatism and tribalism; during this period no charismatic leaders emerged from this milieu – rulers that might have had credibility and influence across the entirety of the Turkic world.

M. Tynyshbaev's statement is appropriate here: «the Khanates that emerged in XV century on the ruins of the Golden Horde was not an independent entity but a number of smaller formations depended on one another, each of which aimed to seize the territory of its neighbors, or worked toward the larger goal of reducing or even destroying the Saray Khanate so they might take its place (Tynishbaev,

1993:130). In other words, we see how local dynastic ruling elites participated in the destruction of the Turkish state and civilization.

As is known, the struggle of Amir Timur with Toktamysch and his allies was characterized by the slaughter of tens of thousands civilians and the destruction of the infrastructure and cities of the Golden Horde. In the later history of Kazakhstan, we see how the Kazakh «white bone» leaders (with the exception of Abylmansur, Kenesary and others) excelled in conformism; being concerned with personal ambitions, their outlook was confined to the boundaries of their Zhuz and immediate surroundings, and they were frequently willing to make concessions to the Russian Tsars, Oirat xuntaydzhi, and Manchu bogdyxan. With very few exceptions, the rulers of the Uzbek khanates (Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand), were open in their goals of personal aggrandizement and ethnic and cultural separatism; they permitted and at times encouraged increased ethnic tensions with the Kazakhs, allowing burdensome taxes and predatory raids on the villages of the senior and little Kazakh zhuz, the Kyrgyz people, and others subject to these asian states in the XIX century.

The continuing violence between Uzbeks and Turkmens in Khiva, and between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Kokand was a result of increasing distrust rooted in linguistic differences between nomadic and settled Muslims (often termed Tajiks or Sarts by various nomadic communities) despite century's old ties and their common Sunni faith. The Uzbek Khanates lost their political independence in the end, becoming the subjects of the Russian empire (the Kokand Khanate was abolished by the tsarist government in the second half of the XIX century).

The modern and contemporary processes of ethnic segregation in the Turkic world unfortunately intensified, and the idea of a political, spiritual and cultural union lost its appeal and power. While some Turkic political leaders in Eurasia sought to unite the Kazakh ethnic group, or to form opportunistic alliances with Karakalpaks, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and others at the end of the XVI-XVIII centuries, the centrifugal forces and forces of decline exceeded the power of their will. Of course, as has been said, none of this happened without the substantial influence of external forces (Russia, China, England, etc.) interested in disintegration and destabilization in Central Asia.

Only later, in the late XIX and early XX twentieth century did a new Turkic intellectual elite of educators and educated Jadid reformers achieve considerable success and radical change in altering

the mass consciousness of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, the Volga-Ural region, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Asia Minor in the direction of unity, cohesion and ethnic solidarity.

During the XVII-XIX centuries, Russia increasingly expanded its protectorate, moving deeper into the Kazakh steppe through the construction of forts and military lines. «Russian colonial authorities sought every possible means, from military conquest to the bribery of the steppe ruling elite by gifts, salaries and even direct blackmail, to win the consent of the Kazakhs to build Cossack villages, fortresses and fortifications» (The History of Kazakhstan, 2000:73). More than 40 million hectares of Kazakh land had been forcibly seized by the Russian state by the beginning of the twentieth century. The Turkic peoples of Eurasia lost the final remnants of their independence, becoming part of a vast empire foreign to them in blood and spirit.

A vast and chaotic dispersal of the nomads and the forced displacement of traditional nomadic pasture routes occurred again in the late XIX and early XX centuries on the territory of present-day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. This caused a series of national liberation uprisings that the Russian Empire brutally suppressed, a suppression complemented by tsarist punitive actions, indemnities and heavy taxes. The masses of indigenous Turkic peoples were forcibly pushed beyond their ethnic borders, their historical homeland, becoming wanderers in a strange land.

The late Middle Ages were characterized by the formation of new, independent Turkic peoples: the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tatars, Bashkir, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and others. Along with the crisis and loss of Turkic identity and its increased fragmentation into disparate folk dialects and languages, there also occurred the formation of distinct ethnicities among Turkic peoples and an intense internal consolidation, creating the preconditions for the creation and codification of national literary languages and traditions. In some contexts, taking into account the different phases of world history, it is necessary to recognize the formation of national languages as historically progressive and necessary – this was true in the case of Kazakh, Tatar, Bashkir, Uzbek, and modern Turkish (as opposed to artificial Turkish-Ottoman), and others (Zya Gokalp, 2000:75).

This was particularly important in light of the dominance of the Arabic-Persian linguistic and religious consciousness that marked the Middle Ages. The artificiality of the literary language *Turki* also became obvious, versions of which had

performed an important integrating function but that had become outmoded and were unsuited to meeting the historical tasks of the modern era. In general, the processes of ethnic differentiation and the formation of local centers of Turkic culture expressed the objective-historical patterns and imperatives of the modern era, in which the principles of a new world order prevailed, one based on nation-states, national cultures, and secularism (Gellner, Ernst, 1991).

However, it would be wrong to believe that independent Turkic peoples quickly forgot their common origins, language, cultural heritage, etc. In fact, this issue requires comprehensive study. Facts, both direct and indirect, need to be gathered to illuminate how separate Turkic peoples maintained a common historical memory, what motivated or worked against their unity, in what manner they mourned their former glory, freedom, and ancestral heritage, the relationship of poets and thinkers related in origin and language, as well as understanding the reasons for the decline and separation of Turkic peoples. In addition, historians need to more closely examine the mutual assistance and cooperation among Turkic peoples who for many centuries experienced similar national and religious oppression.

In the folklore of the Nogai and Kazakhs, poets mourned their rupture and separation from a once ethnically and linguistically unified Golden Horde, which splintered after the death of the defeated Ormambet (Ulug Muhammed). According to V. Trepavlov, after the collapse of the Golden Horde, memory preserved an ideal of unity among scattered peoples and cultivated nostalgia for it, preserving traces of a spiritual heritage long after its collapse and dispersal (Trepavlov, 2011:9).

The Turkic peoples of Central Asia have repeatedly acted in concert against colonialists in mass armed rebellions. The highly educated Tatars, forced to settle in cities and villages among Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, and sharing their fate, are highly respected. Kazakh nomads provided those Tatars who escaped from the imperial authorities and the threat of baptism ages all the assistance required to become part of their communities. In turn, these immigrants and their descendants have honorably served in the field of Islamic education. Several such facts can be noted in the history of Kazakhstan. For example, the village elder and Abay's father, Kunanbai-Hajji was friends with the native born but assimilated elder of the Tatar community, Ishaq Nogai; the son of Abay, Abdrakhman, married a girl of this family. The first teacher of the great

Abay – the village Mullah Gabithan Gabdynazaruly was highly respected among Kazakhs, even though his origins were Tartar (Abay. Encyclopedia, 1995:190).

Thus, there is reason to believe that despite artificial barriers and the policy of «divide and rule», the Turkic peoples sought to maintain economic, trade and cultural ties, and to preserve the consciousness of their historical community, in which language played a significant role. In addition, Islam was an important integrating factor, acting as a guardian of ethnic and cultural identity in the specific historical conditions of Central Asia.

Conclusion

At the XVI-XX centuries the Turkic world as an organic part of the East experienced and continues to experience a civilizational crisis, manifested in efforts to keep up with European nations in science, technology, and education; it is also evidenced in its increasing fragmentation, religious controversies, and the growing conflict and disunity among its varied ethnic formations and states. The characteristic feature of Turkic history of this period is differentiation, fragmentation and the formation of local Turkic cultures and ethnic communities.

In spite the processes of disintegration that play in the late medieval era ethno-cultural differentiation, linguistic diversity, and diverging historical paths – it is still possible to speak of Turkic-Muslim world marked by a resilient cultural and civilizational unity up until the beginning of the dramatic events of the twentieth century. The unprecedented struggles of the Turks of Eurasia and the Kazakhs for ethnic survival that unfolded over the course of the XVI-XX centuries had the paradoxical and positive effect of strengthening their national spirit and historical consciousness. Separation, suffering, and deprivation convinced the best among the Turkic peoples of the need for unity and the restoration of civilization and development.

So it would be wrong to believe that independent Turkic peoples quickly forgot their common origins, language, cultural heritage, etc. In fact, this issue requires comprehensive study. Facts, both direct and indirect, need to be gathered to illuminate how separate Turkic peoples maintained a common historical memory, what motivated or worked against their unity, in what manner they mourned their former glory, freedom, and ancestral heritage, the relationship of poets and thinkers related in origin and language, as well

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