In the article the questions of the state industrial policy of the 1920s are considered from the perspective of neoinstitutional approach that identifies feedback between the economy and political institutions and explore real but not only formal management practices. It is shown that the NEP management system was not complete and holistic. It consisted of a set of not always correlated measures aimed at the elimination of major imbalances of the economy. Management decisions fitted into the overall scheme of approval mechanism for centralized management of state industry and market trend were implemented mainly in the peripheral sectors of the economy. Attempts to fit the public sector of economy to a market economy in order to overcome the latter provided fertile ground for the crisis. A series of crises of the twenties (the financial crisis of 1922, the crisis of sale in 1923, commodity hunger in 1924-1925, the grain procurement crisis in 1927-1928, etc.) were broken out due to the combination of natural process of market relations revival and active but poorly efficient intervention of the party-state leaders. And measures taken to overcome another crisis contributed to further decrease of the market space.

Key words: new economic policy, management, industry, market relations, trust, Council of People’s Commissars, foreign trade.
Introduction

The issues of management of the NEP industry (including the state one) are fairly thoroughly considered both in Soviet and in post-Soviet historiography (Bogomolova, 1993, Drobizhev, 1966. Economic mechanism ... 1990). But in most cases (first of all, in the works on the history of state and law) we are talking about the formal institutional component of management technologies (Korzhikhina, 1986. Nepin, 1999). But in recent years, the study of the informal aspects of the implementation of industrial policy has become increasingly common. If traditional neoclassical theory considers production as an interrelation of resource costs and technologies with GDP, then in the framework of a neoinstitutional approach, attention is drawn primarily to the feedback links between economies and institutions that determine the «rules of the game» (Orlov, 2015). At the same time, the study of real (including formal) practices is added to the analysis of the activities of formal and informal institutions. Thus, the problem of the effectiveness of management ineffectiveness acquires another, very important, dimension.

A new economic policy should be considered not only as a real economy of the 1920s, but also as a management and economic model aimed at solving the problems of economic recovery. Of course, NEP was not a complete and holistic management system. Administrative decisions of this period fit into the general scheme of approval of the mechanism of centralized economic management. The market trend was implemented mainly in peripheral sectors of the economy. The functioning of the state and non-state sectors was not organically linked by a single market. In this vein, NEP should be viewed as an attempt to adapt the public sector of the economy to the market in order to overcome the latter.

Nevertheless, paradoxically, the significance of NEP consists not so much in the transition to a market economy and the dismantling of the super centralized policy system of military communism, but in the experience of overcoming a crisis situation. But the anti-crisis and recovery potential of NEP was limited by a number of demographic (by 1921, in the remaining territories of the empire, population losses in comparison with 1914 amounted to about 25 million people), economic (total industrial output decreased by 5 times, and agricultural production by 40%) and political factors (armed against the communist regime).

Methodology

The article is based on general scientific principles of historicism and objectivity. When writing an article, the authors relied on the principle of historicism, which considers any event in the prism of the past and the future. The comparative method made it possible to investigate the historiography of the problem in close connection with the socio-political and historical situation, as a result of which it arose and acted.

The following methods were used: idiographic, describing the individual characteristics of individual historical facts and events, problem-chronological, reflecting facts and events in a logical sequence.
Main part

The transition to market relations was basically completed by the fall of 1921, prompting the party leadership to implement reforms in the field of state industry. The economic reform of 1921-1923 yy. in industry it was the allocation to the public sector of the largest and most efficient enterprises, more or less provided with fuel, raw materials and personnel and subordinated directly to the Supreme Council of National Economy. Accordingly, the state industry management system was rebuilt. At the end of 1920, the number of main departments and centers of the Supreme Council of National Economy was reduced several times, and with the transition to the NEP, some decentralization of industrial management was accompanied. In May 1921, as a part of the Supreme Council of National Economy, 16 main departments were set up by industry, which led the industrial enterprises through the provincial councils of the national economy.

The industry has been restored monetary wages and introduced tariffs, excluding equalization. Labor armies were abolished and compulsory labor service was abolished. A significant part of the enterprises was withdrawn from the control of the Supreme Economic Council and transferred to local authorities. In addition, some small enterprises were leased to state and cooperative organizations and private entrepreneurs. But the transition of the local industry to new economic relations turned out to be a difficult and painful process. The equipment of most enterprises was extremely worn out, and economic ties between various regions of the country were interrupted during the Civil War. Many enterprises, according to the decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of August 9, 1921, taken from public supply and provided to the power of the market, found themselves in a very difficult position.

The Order of the Council of People’s Commissars on implementing the principles of the new economic policy, published on August 11, 1921, provided for a radical reorganization of the system. For the management of the largest enterprises, trusts were created — associations of homogeneous or interconnected enterprises that received a certain economic and financial independence. In particular, economic accounting provided for the right of trusts (after mandatory fixed contributions to the state budget and contributions to the formation of reserve capital) to manage the income from the sale of products and be responsible for the results of their economic activities. By the end of 1922, almost 90% of industrial enterprises were merged into 421 trusts (of which 40% were centralized, and 60% were of local subordination). True, only trusts received economic independence, and individual enterprises did not become subjects of law. Self-financing rights of factories and plants received only in 1927.

After the reorganization of the Supreme Council of National Economy in connection with the formation of the USSR, the Main Economic Directorate (a regulatory and planning body) and the Central State Industry Directorate (the operational management body) were created instead of the main administrations. Actually, the management of state industry was concentrated at TsUGPROM, the composition of the Board of which was determined by a resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council in early 1924. G.L. Pyatakov, and his deputy – SD Shein. The Board included A.I. Yulin, M.L. Nikiforov, A.P. Chubarov and V.N. Ksandrov, and also A.N. Dolgov and A.M. Ginsburg from GEM VSNH. In turn, two members of the Board of the TSUGPROM (Shein and Yulin) were appointed representatives to the Board of the Main Investigative Board of the Supreme Council of National Economy. Functional departments, bureaus and sectoral directorates were formed as part of the Central management of State Industry (CMSI). The latter were created in order to coordinate and monitor the activities of subordinate industrial and commercial enterprises. Responsibilities between the members of the Board were distributed as follows: Pyatakov and Dolgov were in charge of the financial and budgetary department, the main accounting department, the economic bureau and supervised the general activities of the Board. Shein was in charge of the Directorate, Yulin – the reporting and auditing department, the institutional division, the secretariat and all administrative work, and Nikiforov – the foreign trade department and the capital management department (Orlov, 2015). As we see, the created model of state industry management provided for the coordination of decisions and actions taken in the field of planning and real practice. It is another matter that the general principles and priorities of industrial policy were developed by the party-state leadership of the country, among which, as already noted, there was no unity.

The general management of the economic policy was carried out by the reorganized Labor and Defense Council (STO), headed by the chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, and the members were the people’s commissars for military affairs, labor, means of communication, agriculture, food, the chairmen of the Supreme Council of National
Economy and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Since 1921, regional, provincial, and county economic meetings were formed as local economic authorities. The main bodies of the station were economic meetings in enterprises.

In turn, the task of developing general economic (including industrial) plans was assigned to the State Planning Commission (Gospplan in Russian) established in February 1921. If the SRT carried out the general management of economic policy, and the State Planning Committee worked out a general economic plan and linked the interests of industry with other sectors, the Supreme Economic Council (the Commissariat) implemented the approved SRT plans and general economic directives in the field of industry. According to the Constitution of 1924, the Supreme Council of National Economy was considered as a united people’s commissariat, who headed the republican economic councils, which simultaneously submitted to their CEC and Council of People’s Commissars.

Circulars of higher authorities to the trusts in the years 1923-1925 yy. reflect a very strict regulation of their activities. But an analysis of real practices demonstrates attempts by trusts to circumvent or even ignore prescriptions that are lowering. For example, the circulars of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council on January 16 and June 22, 1923, when concluding credit transactions with private organizations and individuals, were requested to make inquiries about solvency and business qualities of future contractors in the Russian Credit-Bureau partnership each time. In fairness, it should be noted that a whole number of trusts of all-union significance did not comply with these circulars until July 1924 (Orlov, 2015). The acquisition and withdrawal of any property from the main fund of trusts was connected with a change in their authorized capital, which, by virtue of a decree of April 10, 1923, required the authorization of the Workshop. Since the end of November 1924, the Board of CMSI [37. D. 946. L. 123-126]. In accordance with the «Provision on the reserve capital of the trusts» of April 12, 1924, the trusts were asked to submit data on the provision of reserve capital, and in the absence of such security, to develop a plan for such security by June 1 [47]. This decision was confirmed on April 24 by a special circular of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy to the boards of trusts (Orlov, 2015).

By a separate circular of TsUGPROM dated November 10, 1924, trusts of all-union significance indicated the need to produce the orders and purchases necessary for the trusts, primarily from similar trusts. It was motivated by the fact that the conditions for maximum cooperation, mutual support and mutual assistance of the all-union trusts are the key to the successful development of «the entire socialist economy.» However, according to the already established managerial tradition, the circular was understood as a direct prohibition of operations with enterprises of republican and local significance, regardless of the benefits offered by the latter. It took a special clarification that the above circular meant «only the need for all-union trusts to support each other» (Orlov, 2015).

The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR issued a resolution dated January 8, 1925, a duplicate order of the Supreme Economic Council of Ukraine dated January 25 «On the storage of free monetary amounts of state institutions and enterprises operating on the basis of commercial calculation» and a circular to the trusts of all-union values of February 28, 1925 draw up applications for the limits of the amounts that were allowed to be kept at the cash desks for each trust and syndicate enterprise to meet current expenses. This resolution canceled the relevant regulations of the SNK of the RSFSR of March 30 and May 22, 1922, and April 19, 1923 on cash transactions of state enterprises and institutions and the resolution of the SRT of the RSFSR of August 25, 1922 on keeping cash in the cash desks of state enterprises and institutions for the issuance of wages to workers and employees. Now it was established that state institutions and enterprises could keep in their cash desks only the sums necessary to meet current expenses. The maximum amount of the sums was established by the relevant Commissariat of the USSR or the Union Republic in agreement with the People’s Commissariat of Finance (Narkomfin in Russian) of the Union and the Republic, and for local institutions and enterprises – by the executive committees of councils of deputies. In addition to these amounts, the cash desks could be kept no more than three days before the date of issue, salaries and then three funds necessary for current payments. All other sums should have been paid no later than the day following their receipt into current accounts with the State Bank of the USSR, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of the USSR, the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR and other credit institutions, the list of which is established by the USSR Narkomfin (Orlov, 2015).

By order of the Supreme Economic Council on January 12, 1925, all trusts and enterprises of the Supreme Economic Council were invited to use the Realfond office created by Prombank and Electrobank to implement illiquid funds. Since the
trusts stubbornly avoided her services, TsUGPROM, by a circular of March 9, 1925, was compelled to strongly recommend trusts to use the services of this office (Orlov, 2015). On March 10, a decision was made to approve collective agreements of enterprises receiving state subsidies (metal, coal and oil) were assigned to the trusts of the TUGPROM board. The next order of CMSI dated May 22, 1925 ordered the trusts to insure the property belonging to them not directly in the State Insurance, but through the insurance department of Prombank. Despite the fact that the accumulation of insurance rates in the PromBank gave the bank the opportunity to increase its active operations in the interests of industry, it appears that the trusts often ignored these orders (Orlov, 2015).

On March 16, 1925, by a separate circular of CVSI, the trusts were asked to stop issuing advances on wages and all sorts of allowances. But circulars of June and August of the same year testify to the frequent violation by the trusts of this prescription, including authorizing travel to unauthorized persons, paying daily allowances for local travel, using sleeping cars, paying daily allowances in the amount of more than 1/24 of the monthly payout, etc. (Orlov, 2015).

As we see, «it was smooth on paper.» Despite the rapidly spreading cost accounting, mismanagement and squandering of the main fonts and funds of enterprises continued to flourish. The confusion of the initial period of NEP was especially notable. For example, in the fall of 1921, Glavkozh released the Bogorodsk leather tannery 50,000 pounds of chromium for sale and 80,000 for food. But during the holidays, neither the sales order nor the minimum selling prices were established. As a result, almost 38 thousand pounds were sold at a price significantly lower than the market. It is noteworthy that this chromium passed through 4 persons, employees or formerly serving in Glavkozh, and their relatives (Bulletin of the Technical Industrial Inspectorate of the NC RCT. 1921: 1).

At the state Izmailovsky plant, when accepting 22 barrels of linseed oil, water was found in two of them, and the rest – a shortage of 23 pounds. During the acceptance of the threads to the warehouse of Glavkustprom No. 1, there were stones in two boxes. On September 16, 1921, 7 barrels of tar weighing 198 pounds 20 pounds were sent to the Ostashkov State Leather Factory from the Moscow Pyatnitsky warehouse of the Glavkozh warehouse. Upon arrival, 47 pounds of water turned out in the barrels (Bulletin of the Technical Inspection of NK RKI.8. No. 2: 3).

Reporting trusts left much to be desired. Thus, the materials of the Central Department of Statistics of the Main Economic Directorate of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR for April 1924 show that a number of trusts (Uralplatina, Russian Gems, Sakhartrest, Severoles, Yugostal, etc.) did not comply with the order of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR dated October 25, 1923 about reporting, have not submitted it for one month of the operational year. Summarizing the results of the competition for the best report and the balance of the trust and syndicate in July 1925 showed that only 15 of them were submitted for bonuses, but with the proviso that they did not fully meet all the requirements. For the same reason, it was decided not to award the first prize (Orlov, 2015).

The work of large-scale industry was significantly affected by the system of state orders, which began to spread as early as 1922. By the middle of the decade, the state order covered 30% in the metal industry, 41% in the coal industry, and 44% in the oil industry. But since the work of enterprises on state orders was closely related to the state of the state budget, the financial difficulties of the state were shifted to suppliers of products (NEP and cost accounting. 1991: 21). The financial condition of the trusts was aggravated by the fact that social education institutions (schools of the 1st and 2nd stages, children’s homes, pre-school institutions, etc.) hung on their balance sheets. Despite the decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of July 30, 1923, prescribing the trusts to transfer these institutions to the bodies of the People’s Commissariat of Education no later than October 1, and the analogous Circular of the Supreme Economic Council on September 26, 1923, the transfer process was delayed until spring 1925. The trusts at the end of July 1924 were ordered not to incur any expenses for the maintenance of these institutions in the 1924-1925 operational year.

The inability of trusts to compete in the market with a private trader led to the rapid and forced syndication of state industry. Already by the end of 1922, 80% of the traded industry was syndicated, and by the beginning of 1928 there were 23 syndicates that operated in almost all industries, concentrating in their hands the bulk of the wholesale trade. Since the sale of finished products, the purchase of raw materials, materials and equipment were made by syndicates in the market, this determined the emergence of a wide network of commodity exchanges, fairs and trade enterprises.

In the conditions of NEP, the economic functions of the state have changed. If in previous
years, the center established, by order, natural and technological proportions of industrial production, now it has moved on to price regulation, trying to ensure balanced economic growth by indirect methods. A broad campaign to reduce industrial prices was launched by the government at the end of 1923, and the following year they began to regulate them comprehensively. As early as April 1923, the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, on the basis of a report from the Council of Syndicates, called for holding a discussion on the state of the market and the regulation of industrial prices. But until the autumn of 1923, industry leadership expressed the need for an extremely cautious approach to the problem of pricing and proposed to shift the center of gravity in regulating the prices of the trade policy of trusts and syndicates.

In general, price regulation was originally planned to be carried out by economic pressure on the market by means of maneuvering goods in accordance with the requirements of the situation, and the establishment of firm and marginal prices by administrative means was considered inexpedient. Again, the issue of price regulation was raised in connection with the consideration by the State Planning Committee of the draft of the People’s Commissariat of Finance on setting prices for mass consumer goods in pure calculus. This project was brought to life, on the one hand, by the desire of the financial department to compress the «scissors» of prices for industrial and agricultural products, and on the other hand, the resulting «hitch» in the marketing of industrial goods. At the meeting of the Presidium of the State Planning Committee on October 9, 1923, the Chairman of the Finance Section V.M. Smirnov spoke against the forced compression of the «scissors» proposed by the People’s Commissariat of Finance. Instead of declaring rigid prices, they were offered a system of measures to regulate them: the expansion of industrial production, the cheapening of production costs, the importation of goods from abroad, etc.

But such a pricing policy, with the help of which government agencies tried to manage the public sector of the economy, proved to be ineffective. Thus, the decline in the general index by April 1, 1924 took place only in relation to the selling prices of trusts (21%), while all other general stock indices, on the contrary, showed an increase. Moreover, the rise in agricultural prices with a slight decrease in industrial prices led to a general increase in high prices. In addition, the indices of the industrial group decreased in retail by a smaller percentage than the selling prices were reduced. And, finally, a tendency has emerged towards a growing divergence between the selling, wholesale and retail prices of the industry. As in the beginning of NEP, the reduction in the selling prices of trusts under these conditions turned out to be in the hands of only intermediaries (Kantorovich, 1924: 103-107).

In the summer of 1924, in connection with the decisions of the August (1924) plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to expand production and reduce the cost of industrial products, a new stage was opened in reducing prices (Pravda, 1924). But this policy led to the commodity crisis of the fall of 1924, which grew into a real commodity hunger next year (Rykov, 1924: 25-26,28). The fact is that in the course of eliminating the «sales crisis» of the fall-winter of 1923/1924, there was a decrease in the industrial situation more than allowed by the real national economic proportions and the financial position of the industry. Another consequence of the policy of reducing industrial prices at any price was the formation of excess fuel due to the lack of working capital in state industry and the «terrible», according to L.B. Kamenev, the backlog of metallurgy (Kamenev, 1924).

To maintain a policy of reducing industrial prices, even foreign trade levers were used. For example, on April 23, 1924, the SRT decided to allocate 50 million rubles. to finance the purchase of finished products abroad in order to keep low prices on manufactured goods. To accomplish this task and monitor the import operations, a special commission was created headed by L.B. Krasin. In June 1924, F.E. Dzerzhinsky spoke in favor of the need to import agricultural implements, and in December he acknowledged that the policy of resisting the import of capital goods and consumption from abroad was not quite correct, and sometimes completely wrong (Dzerzhinsky, 1977: 12, 91) the factual recognition of the policy of commodity intervention proposed by the opposition at the end of 1923.

In turn, the emission began to act as a means of «supporting» the industry in the context of lower prices, the industrial plans of the summer of 1925 gave impetus. In addition, the long-term construction slowed down (and in some industries stopped) the cost reduction and productivity growth, waste of resources. It had a negative effect on state industry and tax policy. Despite the fact that the provision on the trade tax of January 1923 established preferential conditions for state-owned enterprises (Soviet Commodity Exchange: 1920s, 1992: 88-89), the proportion of income tax on them in the budget reveals a tendency to increase in the twenties If in 1923-1924 y.y. it was only 0.8%, then
in 1924-1925 it was 1.7%, in 1925/1926 it was 2.6%. In the next operating year, despite this area of measure, the proportion of income tax decreased slightly – to 2.3% (Popov, 1927).

In 1925-1927 Narkomfin admitted the volume of industry lending, which led to another increase in inflation. The regulators simply transferred it to a hidden form through the administrative purpose of low prices. This hidden inflation in the form of commodity hunger disrupted the consumer goods market, and then the means of production, laying the foundation for replacing market forms with non-market ones, and trade – with a centralized distribution (Simonov, 1990: 65-57). At the end of 1927, the State Bank also sharply expanded lending to industry, which caused a new rise in prices, exacerbated the shortage of goods and exacerbated grain-supplying difficulties (Manevich, 1989: 70-71). That is, the campaign to regulate (more precisely, to reduce) industrial prices under the pressure of the NKVT promoted the transformation of price regulation into a lever for establishing the rule of the bureaucratic apparatus over the country’s economy.

The transition from the «mixed» to the administrative-command management model. Already at the initial stage of NEP (1921-1923), recognition of the role of the market was combined with measures to abolish it, and from the mid-1920s, measures to curb the development of NEP have been replaced by an open course on its curtailment. The breakdown of NEP was due primarily to its internal contradictions: between «commanding heights» and the private sector, market and administrative methods of managing the economy, etc. In NEP there were many remnants of war communism: the natural tax system, which existed until 1924; nationalization of cooperation; decentralization of industrial management only at the level of trust cost accounting, etc. There was no market mechanism in the relationship between heavy and light industry, heavy industry worked on government orders and subsidies.

The breakdown of NEP was largely due to the inconsistency and inefficiency of the public sector management system of industry. At the same time, all unsuccessful attempts to create a «single economy» were piled onto private capital, despite the fact that in 1923/1924 its share in the fixed capital of the entire industry accounted for a very modest part – only 12%. In the industry of qualification1, it was generally negligible – no more than 0.7% (Dolgov, 1993: 126).

The strategic benchmarks remained, reflected in the GOELRO plan, which limited the limits of the new economic policy both in content (a retreat in order to run for a jump ahead) and in chronological terms – «seriously and for a long time, but not forever.» NEP was considered as a temporary policy, and the attraction of private capital was regarded as the way of its «dialectical» overcoming. In turn, the «foreign policy» NEP was aimed at overcoming international (above all, economic) isolation in the context of the postponement of the world revolution.

The program of the PSC (b) was not revised during the transition to NEP. The emerging concept of NEP was opposed by an ideological scheme of a transitional period, leading to the obligatory victory of socialism. The political outcome of NEP was the survival and strengthening of the Bolshevik regime, which began to highlight the implementation of the political and ideological tasks of the party, which turned into a shadow over the transition to NEP. A system with a combination of economic and political power in the person of the state and the presence of a quasi-market naturally developed into a «coercive economy».

It was in this direction that the organizational structure of state industry management was transformed. On June 3, 1925, a special subdivision of the syndicates department was created at the department of trade policy and prices of the Main Directorate of the Supreme Council of National Economy of Ukraine, and the department itself became an advisory department of the operational management of syndicate activities. In the autumn of 1925, the idea of creating the All-Union Council of Syndicates (ARIA) appeared.

Power plants were considered qualifying at a power of 15 kilowatts, and the mining industry – regardless of the number of workers. Council of syndicates, uniting the latter from above. Such a council was created at the beginning of 1926. It included 15 syndicates, 4 syndicate type trusts, 3 raw materials societies, the Council of Congresses of the Chemical Industry, the Council of Local Trading and the Prombank. In order to coordinate the activities of local branches and branches of syndicates, and, most importantly, the implementation of directives of the governing bodies in October 1926, 11 regional BSS offices were created. By the spring of 1927, 16 local bureaus were deployed, whose functions were not limited to the promptly planned regulation of the supply and marketing activities of the syndicates. Representative offices of large trusts and local tenders, branches of banks and cooperative associations got into the orbit of the bureau’s activities. Thus, the local apparatus of the BCC contributed to the establishment of the control
of syndicates over the local industry (Lyutov, 1996: 67-69).

For the 1920s, characterized by a complex and multi-stage system of negotiation and the establishment of concessions; the negotiations were conducted by the local and the Main Concession Committee, the agreements were concluded by the latter, and the agreements were ratified by the Council (except for agreements on the admission of foreign firms to trade operations in the USSR) by the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR. But the latter were also to be agreed upon by Main Concession Committee with the ITC at the SRT and NKVT. The rights to grant concessions also belonged to different bodies: they gave permission to trade, agricultural, and transport activities to the Main Concession Committee; agreements on technical assistance, financing of exports and construction were concluded directly with government agencies with the permission of the government and under the control of the Main Concession Committee. Direct agreements between the government of the USSR and foreign firms were also allowed (Yakovleva, 1990: 163, 166-167).

In connection with the deterioration of the international situation, the Stalinist leadership once again began to stimulate the development of concessions. In particular, on July 24, 1928, the CPC decided to intensify the concession policy. An indicative plan was approved for putting the objects into concession, and the State Planning Committee was tasked with developing a detailed plan published in September 1928 (Economic Life, 1928). But already in December 1928 at the VIII Congress of Trade Unions in the report of V.V. Kuibyshev called to organize an offensive on concessions as the last island of capitalism. The «harmfulness» of the concession policy was also mentioned in the resolution of the congress (8th All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, 1929: 374, 515). Therefore, by 1930, the concession policy was practically discontinued. At the end of 1930, the Soviet government decided not to conclude new technical assistance agreements in the current financial year in order to save money, and in 1931 it was decided to terminate the conclusion of such agreements in general (Bogomolova, 1992: 161-162). By 1936, only 11 concessions remained in the USSR, but they were small, and the benefits from them were political rather than economic (Pintelin, 1998).

The economic mechanism of the NEP period had a serious influence on the possibilities of the state policy of sectoral research in industry. The assumed stability of the plans, especially GOELRO, was undermined by the orientation of the national economy towards the restoration of market relations. For example, electrotechnical trusts were under state control, which is why industry-wide promising science and technology policy in electrical engineering did not depend on self-interest interests, that is, on those factors that most stimulated the search for effective ways of scientific and technological re-equipment of industry. There were no syndicates here, and in fact it was the last in the twenties that were active agents of a promising scientific and technical policy. By 1926, the rate of recovery of the national economy slowed down, as a result of which electrification rates also decreased. No state subsidies could compensate for the lack of machinery and equipment and the underdevelopment of infrastructure (Bogomolova, 1992: 135-136).

NEP also revealed a number of problems caused by new forms of economic relations in the field of scientific research and experimental design development (R & D). Since the second half of the 1920s, government agencies have become increasingly hard to link the work of research institutions with individual parts of the long-term plan for the development of the national economy.

In practice, this led to the curtailment of a number of scientific and technical developments and laying the foundation for science to largely follow the tail of state tasks. The institutes themselves preferred contractual work to the detriment of long-term scientific and technical projects. In turn, the weak development of contractual relations between science and industry narrowed the scope of application of the results of work carried out within the industry or even one trust (Bogomolova, 1992: 141-145).

**Conclusion**

The results of the NEP policy in general and of industrial policy in particular turned out to be very contradictory. Total for the period 1921-1928. The average annual growth rate of national income was 18%. But at the same time per capita national income in the late 1920s accounted for less than 19% of American. According to A.L. Weinstein, in 1928 the real amount of national income was not 119% (as stated by official statistics), but only 90% of the 1913 level. During the years of NEP, there was no change in the structure of the national economy: the economy was restored almost to the pre-war level, but disproportions between sectors of the economy persisted. The USSR still remained at
the initial stage of industrialization: no more than 25% of the country’s national income was produced by large-scale industry.

The undoubted success of NEP was the restoration of a shattered economy. But significant economic growth rates were achieved to a predominant degree due to the commissioning of pre-war facilities. The private sector was not allowed to «commanding heights in the economy», and foreign investment was not particularly welcomed. By 1928, the share of the «socialist» sector in industry reached 86%. At the intersection of the natural process of the revival of market relations and the active, but incompetent intervention of the party-state leadership in all spheres of social life, a chain of crises of the 1920s was born. An integral part of the NEP reality was a serious structural crisis manifested in various forms: the financial crisis of 1922, the «sales crisis» of 1923, the commodity hunger of 1924-1925, the grain procurement crisis of 1927-1928. In turn, the measures taken to overcome the next crisis contributed to the further narrowing of the NEP freedoms and the formation of a rigid administrative system.

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