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**INFLUENCE OF YALTA PROTOCOLS ON
SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS**

The article examines the influence of decisions taken during the Yalta International Conference of the anti-Hitler coalition on the nature of bilateral Soviet-Turkish relations. At the same time, the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic is characterized, and its influence on the strategy of the Soviet government, which took an ultimatum form during the Second World War is analyzed. The author notes the fallacy of the position of the USSR towards Turkey and its exceptionally negative influence on the possibility of realizing the strategic interests of the USSR in the region.

Key words: USSR, The Second World War, the neutrality of Turkey, the Yalta Conference, V.M. Molotov's ultimatum.

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Қазақ-түрік қарым-қатынасына ялта протоколының әсері

Мақалада антигитлерлік коалицияның Ялта халықаралық конференциясы барысында қабылданған шешімдердің екі жақты кеңес-түрік қарым-қатынастарына ықпалы қарастырылады. Сонымен қатар, Екінші дүниежүзілік соғыс жылдарындағы Түркия Республикасының сыртқы саяси статусы және ультимативті форма ұстанған кеңес үкіметінің стратегиясына әсері баяндалады. Автор КСРО-ның Түркияға қатысты ұстанған позициясының қателігін, сондай-ақ аймақта КСРО-ның стратегиялық іс-қимылдарды жүзеге асыру мүмкіндігіне бұрыс ықпалына тоқталады.

Түйін сөздер: КСРО, Екінші дүниежүзілік соғыс, Түркияның бейтараптығы, Ялта конференциясы, В.М. Молотов ультиматумы.

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Влияние ялтинских протоколов на советско-турецкие отношения

В статье рассматривается влияние решений, принятых в ходе Ялтинской международной конференции антигитлеровской коалиции на характер двусторонних советско-турецких отношений. При этом характеризуется внешнеполитический статус Турецкой республики в годы Второй мировой войны, а также его влияние на стратегию советского правительства, принявшую ультимативную форму. Автор констатирует ошибочность позиции СССР в отношении Турции и ее исключительно негативное влияние на возможность реализации стратегических интересов СССР в регионе.

Ключевые слова: СССР, Вторая мировая война, нейтралитет Турции, Ялтинская конференция, ультиматум В. М. Молотова.

Introduction

The modern system of international relations, in general, was formed on the basis of the results of diplomatic activity of states during the Second World War. At the same time, it should be noted that this system no longer corresponds to many realities, therefore it becomes necessary to reform it. When brought into action, the principle of continuity is of crucial importance and can only be implemented due to a profound study of the trends in the development of mutual relations of the leading actors of international politics.

Taking into account the fact that currently one of the most conflict-risk zones of the world geopolitics is the Middle East region, the problem of studying bilateral Russian-Turkish relations is analyzed, which is impossible without an analysis of their historical development. In view of this circumstance, the focus of this study is on the state of Soviet-Turkish relations at the final stage of the Second World War, taking into account the impact on them to the decisions taken at the international conferences of the anti-Hitler coalition, primarily Yalta.

The Geopolitical Status of the States in Question

It is important to clarify the geopolitical status that the states in question had in this period of time.

The USSR, as is known, was a key participant in the anti-Hitler coalition, the leading force in opposing Nazi aggression. The Turkish Republic in the Second World War took a pragmatic position of sovereignty. At the same time, the policy of the Turkish government demonstrated its friendly nature towards both sides of the conflict. This is evidenced by the nature of the bilateral agreements signed by the Turkish government. Thus, in May and June 1939, it signed agreements with Britain and France on mutual assistance in case of aggression in the Mediterranean region, and on June 18, 1941 – a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Hitler's Germany.

At the same time, it should be recognized that the actions of the Turkish government in the first stages of the Second World War were unfriendly towards the USSR. In particular, as A.A. Sotnichenko points out, during the military victories of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, Turkish political leaders and journalists met repeatedly with German officials, visited the occupied territories, and visited the front. In Turkey, German intelligence services operated, especially near the borders with the USSR. Military

and technical cooperation between the German and Turkish armed forces increased. According to the Turkish foreign minister Hasan Saka, in 1946 80% of the equipment and equipment of the Turkish armed forces was of German production, which indicates a high level of military cooperation between Berlin and Ankara (Sotnichenko, 2010: 219).

Naturally, such a policy of the Turkish government stipulated an extremely low level of intensity of diplomatic contacts between the two countries.

It should be noted that in the initial period of the Second World War, the Soviet government did not pay a special attention to such a position of Turkey. Given the extremely difficult situation, the priority direction of Soviet diplomacy has been the establishment of contacts with the countries that were the main participants in the anti-Hitler coalition: the United States and Great Britain. Accordingly, bilateral relations with Turkey have not received enough attention.

The situation began to change from 1943, which was due to a radical change in the course of military operations – Germany finally lost its initiative on the eastern front, as a result of which the issue of its military and political defeat was predetermined. In the changed conditions, the activity of the anti-Hitler coalition was significantly intensified: its main participants moved to the coordination of projects for the future post-war reconstruction of the world. Naturally, the Soviet leadership headed by JV Stalin hoped to make the most of the outlook situation in geopolitics as much as possible, thus paying attention to bilateral relations with Turkey.

Since that time, the policy of the sovereignty of the Turkish government began to be perceived by the Soviet government as a factor beneficial exclusively to Hitler's Germany. In October 1943, Stalin straightforwardly declared: "At the present time, Turkish neutrality, which was useful in its time to the allies, is useful to Hitler, for he covers his flank in the Balkans," and added that if Turkey claims to participate in the post-war conference "it is necessary that it makes a contribution to the cause of victory and deserve to participate in the peace conference" (Soviet Union at international conferences of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945, 1984: 123).

It is important to note that the desire to use the "Turkish factor" as an additional aspect of achieving a military and political victory over Hitler's Germany was not the only reason for the actualization of bilateral Soviet-Turkish relations. The significant influence on this process was provided by the imperial aspirations of the USSR,

the essence of which was very accurately expressed by the USSR ambassador to Ankara S. Vinogradov, who believed that even Turkey's refusal to join the war on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition "would not be" useless "for us, since would increase the accountability of our claims to Turkey, which we will be able to present in due time" (Gasanly Dzh., 2008:124).

The claims against the Turkish side, which the Soviet ambassador spoke of in 1943, were, in essence, based on two themes. Firstly, it was a question of the return of the former territories of the Russian Empire, handed over by Soviet Russia to the government of Kamalist Turkey. Then, seeking to get out of international isolation, the Bolsheviks voluntarily surrendered to the Turks in Transcaucasia the regions of Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin and recognized the new northeastern border of Turkey. Now, at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet leadership considered that it was a convenient time for them to return back. (Moshkin, 2009: 245-253)

Another direction of the diplomatic offence against Ankara was the attempt of the Soviet leadership to revise the Montreux Convention international convention, adopted in 1936 and consolidating Turkey's sovereignty over the Black Sea straits (Ucarol Rifat, 1995: 651). Obviously, the purpose of such an audit was to gain opportunities to exercise control over the entire Black Sea region.

The Soviet leadership reasonably believed that it would resolve the first of these aspects in the conditions of the preservation of the position of the friendly government towards Hitler's neutrality by the Turkish government, this would not constitute significant difficulties in the context of bringing Turkey to international responsibility. The second aspect could not be solved without the support of other leading members of the anti-Hitler coalition. At the same time, it was extremely difficult to achieve a positive resolution of this issue in the context of realizing the interests of the Soviet side, given the initial distrust of Stalin's plans on the part of his closest allies, primarily F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill, since, traditionally, Britain had its own interests in Black Sea region.

In this connection, it is not surprising that Stalin's attempt to discuss Soviet proposals regarding the Straits of W. Churchill in October 1944 during his visit to Moscow was practically unsuccessful.

The British prime minister took a very restrained position in this matter, in fact refusing to discuss Soviet proposals, citing the untimely nature of the statement of this issue. (Soviet Union at international conferences of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945,

1984, T-1: 123) At the same time, certain results were nevertheless achieved – Churchill informed his closest ally Roosevelt of the USSR's intention to change the regime of the Black Sea straits, and the Allies decided to make minor concessions to Moscow on this issue. However, the main achievement of the Soviet government was the inclusion of the issue of the Straits in the agenda of the next international conference of the allies on the anti-Hitler coalition, which was scheduled for February 1945 in Yalta.

It seems that the consideration of the problem of the regime of the Straits of substance during the work of the Yalta Conference was made possible by a change in the position of W. Churchill. The impossibility of confronting the USSR was taken into account, taking into account the position of Turkey and the indifferent attitude to this issue of the American leadership, the British Prime Minister took the position of moderate concessions to Stalin, counting along with the USSR to retain control over the most strategically important region. As a result, Churchill provided the Soviet leadership with the opportunity to formulate a set of concrete proposals on the question of the regime of the Straits.

The result of the Yalta Conference was an agreed protocol on the regime of the Black Sea straits, in which the agreement was reached on a forward-looking detailed discussion of the regime of the Black Sea straits at the next meeting of the foreign ministers of the allied powers scheduled to be held in London. At the same time, at the urging of the British side, this protocol included the thesis of obligatory informing the Turkish side about the progress of the education of this issue provided that it does not question the sovereignty and integrity of the Turkish Republic.

The Soviet leadership took the signing of the above-mentioned protocol as the basis for the opportunity to intensify bilateral relations with Turkey from a position of strength. On March 19, 1945, during the reception of the Turkish ambassador, the Soviet Foreign Minister V. Molotov issued a statement on the necessity of denouncing the Soviet-Turkish non-aggression and neutrality treaty of 1925, since its provisions no longer correspond to the international situation. At the same time, Molotov stressed the necessity and desirability of concluding a new friendly treaty, linking this fact to the fulfillment by the Turkish side of a number of conditions that were examined by him in June 1945, namely, the return of the regions of Kars and Ardahan, permission to use Soviet military bases in the Black Sea straits during wartime, consent to the revision of the international convention on the Straits of Mothra, providing for

the possibility of their joint military defense in time of war. (Smol'njak I. V., 2016: 200)

It should be noted that the Western allies of Turkey did not give any substantial guarantees of support, recommending considering the Soviet proposals as friendly. Moreover, Deputy Director of the Office of Middle Eastern and African Affairs D. Allen in June 1945 in a memo addressed to President G. Truman actually agreed with Soviet proposals, saying that the straits should be withdrawn from the monopoly control of the Turkish government and transferred to control all the Black Sea powers. In fact, this meant consent to monopoly control over the strategically important region by the USSR (Smol'njak I. V., 2016: 201).

It seems that the above position of Great Britain and especially the United States indicated the intention to frankly sacrifice the interests of the Turkish Republic for the sake of gaining the opportunity to practically realize its key geopolitical interest at the time – to ensure the continued participation of the USSR in the war and create a system to counter Soviet influence in Europe.

However, it should be noted that the Western governments succeeded not only in successfully solving the above tasks but also in preventing the implementation of Soviet requirements for Turkey, voiced in March 1945 by Molotov as an element of the new in-

ternational order. These issues were left at the mercy of bilateral diplomacy, which seemed to be a key factor in the subsequent complication of Soviet-Turkish relations. As is known, in the long term, the negative rhetoric of Soviet-Turkish relations led to significant harm to the interests of the USSR in the Black Sea region, which was due to the inclusion of the Turkish Republic in the western orbit of influence. The culmination of this process was the entry of the Turkish Republic into the North Atlantic alliance.

Conclusion

Thus, the decisions concerning the regime of the Black Sea straits adopted during the Yalta conference had a negative impact on the nature of bilateral Soviet-Turkish relations. Ultimately, the position taken by the USSR in accordance with the results of this international forum, as well as the rhetoric used by Soviet diplomacy (the actual ultimatum of VM Molotov in March 1945), led to a permanent alienation in bilateral relations, which, it seems, caused significant damage, primarily to the strategic interests of Moscow. Therefore, it seems possible to note the essential miscalculations made by Soviet diplomacy in the development of a strategy of relations with the Turkish Republic at the final stage of the Second World War.

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