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<https://doi.org/10.26577/JH.2022.v106.i3.01>**Mohammad Mullah Salangi** Bamyan University, Afghanistan, Bamyan
e-mail: mfrotansallangi@gmail.com**PAKISTAN'S ROLE IN CONTINUING
AFGHANISTAN CIVIL WAR
(1978-2001)**

The interference of Afghanistan's neighboring countries, in particular Pakistan, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan has been considered a major factor behind the continuity of the civil war. From the early stage of the war against the Soviets and PDPA regime, Pakistan became the headquarters of the political leaders of the mujahedeen parties, as well as the host of millions Afghan refugees. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused the destabilization of the region. This regional instability resulted in US aid to the mujahedeen and the United States also agreed with Pakistan to be the conduit of arms and supply to mujahedeen groups in Afghanistan.

The direct involvement of Pakistani military leaders and the ISI in the internal affairs of Afghanistan began with a failed coup led by Muslim Brothers of Afghanistan against President Daoud in the spring of 1974. After the coup crashed, many of the Muslim brothers escaped to Pakistan, where they received direct support from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime. The Pakistani military, led by the commander of Pakistan's Frontier Corps, Brigadier Nasirullah Babur, became involved in Afghanistan's internal affairs. Therefore, Babur has been the leading advocate of Pakistan's forward policy – direct intervention toward Afghanistan. The geopolitical perception of Pakistan in Afghanistan should be examined in the light of the developing situation and Pakistan's persistent efforts to establish a pliable and subservient regime in Afghanistan. Therefore, despite United Nations and other regional and International powers efforts; because of Pakistan's interferences, Afghanistan couldn't succeed to reach a peacefully settlement; and, unfortunately the civil war continued till today.

Key words: Civil War, ISI, PDPA, Mujahedeen, Forward Policy, Resistance, Central Asia.

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e-mail: mfrotansallangi@gmail.com**Ауғанстандағы азаматтық соғыстағы
Пәкістанның рөлі (1978-2001)**

Ауғанстанның көршілерінің, атап айтқанда Пәкістанның Ауғанстанның ішкі істеріне араласуы азаматтық соғыстың жалғасуының басты факторы болып саналады. Кеңес Одағы мен PDPA режиміне қарсы соғыс басталғаннан бері Пәкістан моджахедтер партияларының саяси жетекшілерінің штаб-пәтеріне, сондай-ақ миллиондаған ауған босқындарының баспанасына айналды. Кеңес Одағының Ауғанстанға басып кіруі аймақтағы тұрақсыздыққа әкелді. Бұл аймақтық тұрақсыздық АҚШ-тың моджахедтерге көмектесуіне әкелді және Америка Құрама Штаттары да Пәкістанмен Ауғанстандағы моджахед топтары үшін қару-жарақ пен жеткізілім өткізетін арнаға айналуға келісті.

Пәкістандық әскери жетекшілер мен ISI-дің Ауғанстанның ішкі істеріне тікелей араласуы 1974 жылдың көктемінде Ауғанстандағы «Мұсылман бауырлар» партиясы президент Даудқа қарсы жасаған сәтсіз төңкеріспен басталды. Төңкеріс сәтсіз аяқталғаннан кейін көптеген мұсылман бауырлар Пәкістанға қашып кетті, олар Зүльфикар Али Бхутто режимінен тікелей қолдау алды. Пәкістанның Шекара корпусының қолбасшысы, бригада генералы Насирулла Бабыр бастаған пәкістандық әскерилер Ауғанстанның ішкі істеріне араласты. Осылайша, Бабыр Ауғанстан ісіне тікелей араласу жөніндегі Пәкістанның озық саясатының негізгі жақтаушысы болды. Пәкістанның Ауғанстандағы геосаяси көзқарасын жағдайдың эволюциясы және Пәкістанның Ауғанстанда талапқа сай және мойынсұнғыш режим орнатудағы табанды күш-жігері тұрғысынан қарау керек. Сондықтан БҰҰ және басқа аймақтық және халықаралық державалардың күш-жігеріне қарамастан, Пәкістанның интервенциясына байланысты Ауғанстан бейбіт келісімге келе алмады және өкінішке орай, азамат соғысы күні бүгінге дейін жалғасуда.

Түйін сөздер: азаматтық соғыс, ISI, PDPA, моджахедтер, озық саясат, қарсыласу, Орталық Азия.

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Роль Пакистана в продолжающейся гражданской войне в Афганистане (1978-2001 гг.)

Вмешательство соседних с Афганистаном стран, в частности Пакистана, во внутренние дела Афганистана считается основным фактором продолжения гражданской войны. С самого начала войны против Советского Союза и режима PDPA Пакистан стал штаб-квартирой политических лидеров партий моджахедов, а также пристанищем миллионов афганских беженцев. Советское вторжение в Афганистан вызвало дестабилизацию региона. Эта региональная нестабильность привела к тому, что США оказали помощь моджахедам, к тому же Соединенные Штаты также согласились с Пакистаном стать каналом оружия и снабжения для групп моджахедов в Афганистане.

Непосредственное участие пакистанских военачальников ISI во внутренних делах Афганистана началось с неудавшегося переворота во главе с «Братьями-мусульманами Афганистана» против президента Дауда весной 1974 года. После провала переворота многие братья-мусульмане бежали в Пакистан, где они получили прямую поддержку режима Зульф리카ра Али Бхутто. Во внутренние дела Афганистана были вовлечены пакистанские военные во главе с командующим Пограничным корпусом Пакистана бригадным генералом Насируллой Бабуром. Таким образом, Бабур был главным сторонником передовой политики Пакистана – прямого вмешательства в дела Афганистана. Геополитическое восприятие Пакистана в Афганистане следует рассматривать в свете развития ситуации и настойчивых усилий Пакистана по установлению податливого и послушного режима в Афганистане. Поэтому, несмотря на усилия ООН и других региональных и международных держав, из-за вмешательства Пакистана Афганистану не удалось достичь мирного урегулирования и, к сожалению, гражданская война продолжается до сих пор.

Ключевые слова: гражданская война, ISI, PDPA, моджахеды, передовая политика, сопротивление, Средняя Азия.

Introduction

Exactly 100 years after the British contrived to set up Afghanistan as a buffer state between the expanding Russia Empire in Central Asia and their empire in India, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan blurred the frontiers between the successor states of the Czarist Russia and British-India. Pakistan also acquired the status of a front line state in the Cold War.

Pakistan's military dictator, Zia ul-Haq, was more than willing to lead a crusade against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After he had ousted the elected government of Bhutto in July 1977, he had considerably tarnished his image both at home and abroad. He had promised elections in 6 months for the re-establishment of civilian rule. Instead he set up a military dictatorship and martial law. His ignominious hanging of Bhutto, despite worldwide appeals for clemency, had been condemned by all sides, and he felt isolated. As a zealous Muslim and anti communist his natural sympathies lay with the Afghan resistance which he had been covertly assisting. After the Soviet invasion, his trusted director-general of ISI, the Pashtun General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan, advised him that there would

be a convergence of religious, political and strategic gains if Pakistan were to assume the role of an Islamic champion against communist aggression (Yousaf, 1992: 25-26).

Pakistan also had ready-made instruments to hand in order to accomplish such a role covertly, without provoking possible retaliation under the terms of the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of 1978. These were the various Afghan political parties that had set up their headquarters in Peshawar after their failed uprising against Daoud; and then they became active in supporting the internal resistance against the communists. When tens of thousands people seek refugees into Pakistan, the Pakistani authorities were overwhelmed, and turned to the exile Afghan leaders in Peshawar to manage the situation. Since the refugees had to be recommended by one of the Parties in order to be eligible for food rations, the small, unrepresentative Peshawar-based parties became mass organizations (Rasanayagam, 2011: 102-103).

In the end, though, Zia was able to turn the Soviet threat into an opportunity. Following the advice of ISI, he made the decision to throw his country's resources behind the Afghan resistance, thus assuming the roles of defender of Islam and

front-line coordinator of the global fight against communism. As long as he played the part to the satisfaction of the United States and the Arab oil potentates, he could count on de facto acquiescence in his undemocratic rule.

Zia did not publically acknowledge his arms aid to the mujahedeen. In any case, most of the arms used by the resistance groups in the early years were brought over by Afghan army deserters or were captured from government outposts. Some of the rest came from China, arranged through American intermediaries, paid for by the Gulf States, and smuggled in by roundabout routes. All the assistance was funneled through the ISI, which reported directly to Zia and operated independently of the armed forces and the foreign ministry; the latter could honestly plead innocence. On the other hand, though, Pakistan's role in training the mujahedeen was harder to conceal. Between 1984 and 1987 alone, 80,000 mujahedeen passed through training camps run by the ISI. Pakistani hospitals near the border also treated thousands of injured fighters. By the mid-1980s, several thousand foreign Muslim volunteers had rallied to the jihad, finding their way to the various camps in Pakistan and in some cases actually joining the fighting in Afghanistan. Most of them were Arabs, many of them Sunni militants from Saudi Arabia, but they were joined by recruits from the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Southeast Asia (Wahab, 2007: 178-79).

Kabul and Moscow were convinced, not without reason, that the spreading insurrections in Afghanistan were encouraged, armed and directed by Pakistan. Whenever such charges were publically leveled at Pakistan, they were flatly denied. Pakistan was able to maintain the fiction for at least three reasons. In the first place, the Afghan resistance was a spontaneous affair and did not depend on external moral or material support for its élan. Secondly, the material support hitherto provided by Pakistan to the mujahedeen through the Peshawar parties was modest, consisting mainly of outdated equipment from its own armories that were replenished with more modern Chinese weapons bought with funds donated by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Thirdly, the whole support program was a very covert operation from beginning to end, conducted in paranoid secrecy by the ISI; and the rest of the administration, including the Foreign Ministry and the regular armed forces, and was kept in the dark. The fiction was maintained even when the

level of support reached massive proportions after the United States became involved.

Pakistan's geopolitical strategy had been driven by realist instincts to counter Indian hegemony by securing strategic depth in Afghanistan. This would deny its arch rival any influence along Pakistan's Western border and eliminate Afghan irredentist claims against Pakistan by leveraging a religious fervor to crush secular Pashtun nationalism. So Pakistan supported Afghan mujahedeen, such as Hakmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami, were supposed to fill the void created by the Soviet withdrawal (1989) and subsequent collapse of the Moscow-backed Communist regime (1992). Instead, a chaotic civil war engulfed Afghanistan (Chan, 2008).

Materials and Method

For the purpose of the present study, the sources on Pakistan's involvements and interferences in internal affairs of Afghanistan which caused the civil war in the second half of the 20th century have been closely observed. To indicate the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan civil war, sources and data on the different stages of the civil war have been used. Beside the historical books, I also used Journals, essays, newspapers, maps, Documentaries and so on, about the interferences of Pakistan in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

The method considered in this article is qualitative method. In this method, first, the sources relevant to the subject were collected, after ascertainment of their authenticity and credibility; the collection of raw material was over. The mass of raw material had been properly reviewed, unified, refined and processed; various points relating to a particular topics and sub-topics brought together and co-related in a rational way, and then the conclusion drawn and the generalization made from them, interpreting the facts carefully to illustrate the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan civil war from 1979-2001.

Area of Study: Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a country with a myriad history inflicted with conflicts of interests among regional and international powers; specially neighboring countries. The regional powers interferences in the internal affairs of Afghanistan lead to wars and political turmoil so much so that the country cannot be turned to a stable state. The external factors of

Afghan civil war are more visible than the internal factors. So, to now the nature of Afghan civil war, it is necessary to have a deep-look into the role of Afghanistan's neighbors' involvements, especially Pakistan interferences in Afghanistan.

Result and Discussions

Historical Background

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have essentially remained estranged, despite their shared geography, ethnicity and faith. The only departure perhaps would be the four years (1996-2001) of Taliban rule. While the principle historical cause of this attitude has been the unresolved issue of the Durand Line (1893), tensions and suspicion between Pakistan and Afghanistan have also emanated from their divergent strategic outlook and dissimilar national ethos. It is important to note that, Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan's admission to the United Nations, conditioning its recognition upon the provision that the right of self-determination be given to the people of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (Burke, 1991: 73).

In September 1953 Daoud assumed power as prime minister. His energetic efforts at modernization and Pashtunistan Issues within the confines of a conservative and autocratic regime led to developments with ominous consequences for the future: the beginnings of the abandonment of the traditional Afghan policy of neutrality. Afghanistan was in dire need of external economic and military assistance. The Afghan government asked for military assistance from the United States, which was in a position to help, but because of its close and strategic alliance with Pakistan, refused to assist; and the secretary of the state, John Foster Dulles, replied that: "After careful consideration, extending military aid to Afghanistan would create problems not offset by the strength it would generate. Instead of asking for arms, Afghanistan should settle the Pashtunistan dispute with Pakistan." (Klass, 1987: 43). The outraged Daoud turned immediately to the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan step by step became wholly dependent on the Soviet Russia.

The Pashtunistan problem had originated with the demarcation by the British in 1893 of the Durand Line, the border splits the Pashtuns. The Durand Line was not an 'international frontier' in the accepted sense and its status was not without ambiguity. The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 referred to the

mutual interest of the contracting parties in the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries (Dupree, 1997: 487).



Before partition in 1947 the British sponsored a referendum in the Pushtunistan area, giving them the choice of joining either India or Pakistan; the overwhelmingly Muslim population of the area voted to join Pakistan. The Afghan government objected to this procedure on the grounds that the Pashtunistan belonged to the same category as the 562 self-governing princely states of British India that had been presented with a third option – becoming independent. In fact, denying the third option to the frontier Pashtun tribes, the Durand Line had been treated as an international border (Rasanayagam, 2011: 31).

When Pakistan applied for United Nations membership in September 1947, Afghanistan, a fellow Muslim state, cast the only negative vote. The Afghans also revoked unilaterally the Anglo-Afghan treaties containing references to 'boundaries', and had this action endorsed by a loya jirga (grand council). So began a period of acute tension between the two neighbors. The Afghan-Pakistani confrontation intensified in March 1955 when Pakistan announced the One Unit Plan to create the single province of West Pakistan, symmetrical to the existing single province of East Pakistan. For Daoud the One Unit Plan was a provocation, an attempt to treat the Durand Line as the official frontier and to absorb the Pashtunistan into Pakistan.

The most prominent proponents of Pashtunistan in British India before Partition had been Dr Khan

Sahib and his elder brother, Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan. The latter was known as the Frontier Gandhi, and his leadership of a radical movement for Pashtun social reform called the 'Red Shirts' (Ansary, 2014: 128). It is possible that Indian Congress leaders had promised Pashtun autonomy within an independent India. In fact, Pashtunistan meant different things to different people: to Ghafar Khan, it may well have carried spiritual overtones. He had devoted his life, not just to independence, but to the moral regeneration of a people racked by blood feuds, bribery, family disputes and degrading social customs. To his fellow Pashtuns of the area, Pashtunistan could mean anything from autonomy within Pakistan to complete independence. To the tribesmen straddling the Durand Line, it probably meant the splendid prospect of everlasting anarchy, without interference from north or south. To the rulers of Kabul, who adopted the call for Pashtunistan with alacrity, it clearly implied the integration of Pashtunistan into the Afghan state (Arney, 1990: 35).

Since 1947 both countries have interfered in each other's internal affairs. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave Pakistan a suitable opportunity to wage a proxy war in Afghanistan, garnering the support of Western and Arab allies. Since the end of Cold War, Pakistan was even more conscious and proactive about maintaining her influence and control over Afghanistan, the result being the creation and support of the Jahadi and extremist groups.

Dissimilarities in their levels of socio-political structure, socio-economic development, and Pakistan's repeated interference in the internal issues of Afghanistan have contributed in causing irritation in relations between the two countries. The dynamics of continuity and change have marked Pakistan's interaction with Afghanistan, and the character of those ties has been decisively shaped by Islamabad's quest for a friendly and puppet regime in Kabul which would allow Pakistan to escape the nightmare of being sandwiched between a hostile India in the East and an irredentist Afghanistan in the West (Weinbaum, 1994: 1).

Pakistan's Forward Policy (1978-1992)

Afghanistan has been victim of regional and international hegemonic designs of regional and Super Powers. It has great importance to outreach the Central Asian Republic States. As we have seen, there (were) are lots of ups and down in the relationship of Pakistan and Afghanistan (Mustafa, 2018). The

geopolitical perception of Pakistan in Afghanistan should be examined in the light of the developing situation and Pakistan's persistent efforts to establish a pliable and subservient regime in Afghanistan. For years, Pakistan has been projecting Afghanistan in terms of an entity that can provide "strategic depth" vis-à-vis India. However, some Indian analysts have seen the necessity of Pakistan's advocacy of strategic depth in Afghanistan in terms of territorial ambitions and its aims of expanding its strategic frontiers towards the West and Central Asian region. Secure western borders and a subservient regime will enable Pakistan to deploy most of its armed forces against India (Ghosh, 2011: 26).

Pakistani military leaders and the ISI's Afghanistan Bureau were involved in Afghanistan for decades. The direct involvement of Pakistani military leaders and the ISI began with a failed coup led by Muslim Brothers of Afghanistan against President Daoud in the spring of 1974. After the coup crashed, many of the Muslim brothers escaped to Pakistan, where they received direct support from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime. As Anthony Davies writes: "President Daoud's strident support for the cause of Pushtunistan-an irredentist vision of a greater Afghanistan embracing Pushtun tribal lands in Pakistan, was feared by Pakistani's leaders." (Davis, 1996: 14). The Pakistani military, led by the commander of Pakistan's Frontier Corps, Brigadier Nasirullah Babur, became involved in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Babur has been the leading advocate of Pakistan's forward policy – direct intervention toward Afghanistan. "I told the government we must have some elements to influence events in Afghanistan in case there was trouble," Babur later explained. Soon, a group of Afghan Ikhwanis (Muslim Brothers), led by Hekmatyar and Rabbani, were recruited and supported by the Pakistani government against President Daoud's regime. These Afghan youths were sent to the Cherat Army camp near Peshawar, where they received sources and military training "dressed in the uniforms of Babur's Frontier Corps – ostensibly Pakistan from the tribal areas." Hekmatyar and Massoud were among those trained in Pakistan. The ISI armed 30 of these young Afghans, commanded by Massoud, to attack the Afghan army stations in late July 1975. This group was destroyed mostly by the local Afghan community in Panjshir valley with the government support. Later Babur recalled the operation as a success and he stated, "I told Mr. Bhutto it is time

we conveyed a message to Daoud” (Nojumi, 2002: 128).

After the PDPA military coup in 1978, General Zia-ul-Haq and his military circle were looking for a strategic ally in post-Communist Afghanistan to provide Pakistan with strategic depth in its struggle with India and a bridgehead for Islamic revolt into the Muslim underbelly of the Soviet Union. Hekmatyar's long-term connection with the Pakistani elements and his revolutionary pan-Islamism incorporated the political ideology of General Zia and mirrored the beliefs of several senior ISI officers, such as General Hamid Gul. In this case, Hekmatyar's large, well-organized Hezb Party became the favored vehicle for Zia's vision in Afghanistan. When the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the political ideology of General Zia dominated the Pakistan government, and ISI became massively involved in Afghanistan. As Anthony Davis states:

The ISI under the command of Lt.-general Abdul Akhtar Raham, a close confidant of then-president Zia, intended to run the conflict in a hands-on fashion. “Not only did ISI serve as the sole conduit for U.S. and Saudi-funded munitions reaching the mujahedeen parties,” recalls one Western analyst, “ISI officers were also closely involved in planning and directing operations.” Indeed, the ISI came to see the Afghan as its own, with the mujahedeen viewed as valiant but ill-disciplined warriors serving as the sharp end of a strategy made in Islamabad. As Brig. Mohammad Yousuf was later to write of his 1983 appointment as director of ISI's Afghanistan Bureau: “I was now cast in the role of overall guerrilla leader.” (Davis, 1996:14).

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Zia asked General Akhtar for an appraisal of the threat posed by the invasion. General Akhtar predicted that sooner or later the Russians would invade Baluchistan, seeking a warm-water port on the Arabian Sea. In his assessment, Pakistan was caught between the Russians to the west and India to the east and sooner or later they would join together to destroy Pakistan. To prevent that, he recommended that Pakistan substantially increase its aid to the mujahedin. Zia had another worry as well. After several years out of power, Indira Gandhi was reelected prime minister of India in January 1980. Like all Pakistani generals, Zia feared Indira more than other Indian politicians; after all, she had already helped break up the union of East and West Pakistan. Indira Gandhi regarded Zia as just another

Pakistani general, like those that she had defeated decisively in 1971 (Frank, 2002: 441).


Zia dispatched General Akhtar to Riyadh with an urgent message for the king of Saudi Arabia and wanted Saudi assistance to strengthen the mujahedin in Afghanistan. According to Prince Turki, the head of Saudi intelligence, king Khalid agreed immediately, and the ISI and Turki's General Intelligence Directorate (GID) began cooperating to aid the mujahedin. The Saudi-Pakistani partnership would soon acquire another partner, the CIA (Riedel, 2014: 61).

Zia's right hand man was the powerful director general of the ISI, General Akhtar, within the ISI, he established Afghan Bureau which was the command post for war in Afghanistan and operated in the greatest secrecy, with its military staff wearing civilian clothes. Its head reported to Akhtar, who also devoted some 50% of his time to the affairs of the Bureau and reported directly to Zia. The respective roles of the CIA and the ISI's Afghan Bureau are best summed up by Mohammad Yousaf:

To sum up: the CIA's tasks in Afghanistan were to purchase arms and equipment and their transportation to Pakistan; provided funds for the purchase of vehicles and transportation inside Pakistan and Afghanistan, train Pakistani instructors on new weapons or equipment and; provide satellite photographs and maps for our operational planning; provide radio equipment and training, and advise on technical matters when requested. The entire planning of the war, all types of training for the mujahedeen, and the allocation and distribution of arms and supplies were the sole responsibility of the ISI, and my office in particular (Yousaf, 1992: 95-6).

The operational base of the ISI's Afghan Bureau was the Ojhri Camp, located on the northern outskirts of Rawalpindi, and 12 km from capital, Islamabad, which had three branches: First, an operations branch under a full colonel was responsible for coordinating intelligence from various sources and controlling day-to-day planning and operations. Second, a logistics branch which was responsible for collecting the weaponry delivered by the CIA from the port Karachi and air force bases around the country and for allocating, dispatching and delivering to the warehouses belonging to the Peshawar parties for distribution to their mujahedeen commanders. The third branch dealt with psychological warfare: the operation of border radio stations, the distribution of pamphlets, and the conduct of interviews and so on (Rasanayagam, 2011: 107-108).

The greatest advantage that the mujahedeen as a guerrilla force had were the safe havens in Pakistan to which they could withdraw from time to time to rest and refit, gather the supplies that they needed, receive training in the use of the increasing sophisticated weapons that US was delivering, and be briefed on the superior intelligence concerning Soviet military deployments that the CIA was providing through the ISI. The arms pipeline to the mujahedeen consisted of three distinct parts, the first being the responsibility of the CIA who bought the weapons and paid for their delivery to Pakistan. The second stretch involved their transport across Pakistan and their allocation and delivery to the parties. This was the responsibility of the ISI. The final leg of the journey belonged to the parties and to their commanders in the field (Ibid: 111-12).



The arrival of large amounts of international aid particularly that from the United States, to the hands of the Pakistani government made the ISI a custodian of the mujahedeen leaders. Even after General Zia, this situation enabled the ISI to not only put pressure on Afghan leaders, but also give political muscle to the ISI leaders to filter out the Afghan

political activists, in particular in Pakistan. This situation led the ISI to act against any mujahedeen organization both inside and outside who wanted to run the war against the Soviets in accordance with Afghanistan interests. Politically, the pressure of ISI on the Afghan leaders in Pakistan disabled the mujahedeen leaders to coordinate their activities according to what was going on inside the country in the battlefields. On the international level, the mujahedeen leaders failed to represent collectively the mujahedeen's view on the future of Afghanistan. This failure of Afghan political leaders abolished their role in the Geneva Accords, where Pakistani diplomats and the United States represented Afghanistan. This disability caused a destructive gap between the mujahedeen political leaders in Pakistan and the field commanders inside. This situation resulted in the formation of the mujahedeen regional organizations that were able to manage their political and military affairs in accordance with the political, social, and military situations inside the country. However, it is interfering in the affairs of mujahedeen, preventing the formation of nationally based leadership in Afghanistan. The emergence of these regional mujahedeen armed political groups inside Afghanistan became a serious threat to the regional strategy of the ISI.

The activities of the ISI came under pressure by the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations after the withdrawal of the Soviets in Afghanistan. In this period of time, the ISI pushed a military solution against Kabul regime in Afghanistan. The ISI supported the military coup led by General Tanai and Hekmatyar against Dr. Najibullah in March 1990. The defeat of this military coup was a big blow to the ISI's regional strategy and caused more pressure from the non-military political leadership of Pakistan on the ISI. The formation of the National Commanders Council (NCC) in Kunar was the most important political development against the ISI's regional strategy. Through this council, the mujahedeen commanders were able to deal with the fate of the Afghan nation together, without the influence of the neighboring countries (Nojumi, 2002: 129)

These new political and military developments in Afghanistan forced the ISI to organize a military plan with forces of Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar (HIH) against Kabul regime. This militaristic plan aimed to capture Kabul and was in full force when the governments of Pakistan, Iran, Russia, the United States, and the rest of the mujahedeen leaders in

Pakistan agreed to the UN peace plan. On the eve of the successful implementation of the UN peace plan in Afghanistan, the ISI, through Hekmatyar and non-Afghan volunteers, led hundreds of trucks loaded with weapons and fighters to the southern part of Kabul. This military deployment of the ISI and Hekmatyar concerned other political armed forces within Dr. Najibullah's government forces and the mujahedeen forces, in particular Massoud units. A secret military operation, with the direct support of the ISI and planned by the Hekmatyar and the ex-Khalqis, in particular the Interior Minister's forces, aimed to capture Kabul and install Hekmatyar as the head of the government. This secret military plan forced Massoud and his allies to move into Kabul. This military buildup caused the UN peace plan to remain only on paper forever. So, Afghanistan lost the golden opportunity for achieving peace settlement.

After the collapse of Dr. Najibullah's government in 1992, the ISI attempted to use the conflict between the armed forces toward the formation of a coalition force under the leadership of Hekmatyar against Massoud-led forces. For this purpose, the ISI and other Pakistani leaders visited General Dustum and other ex-mujahedeen leaders who were in Pakistan. The main political hope for the ISI was to unite the southern Pushtun Heartland under the leadership of Hekmatyar and overrun Kabul. But the formation of the regional political and military organization, in particular the Nangarhar Shura within the Pushtun population of the country, dismantled such a hope (Nojumi, 2002: 130).

Pakistan's Policy Toward Afghanistan (1992-1996)

Political instability, coups and involvements of Pakistan in the region, faced it extreme economic shortage; this issue changed Pakistan's strategy toward Afghanistan. After the collapse of the Soviet empire, Central Asia emerged as a vital market for the economic and the regional development. During the Cold War, Pakistan's strategy toward Afghanistan concentrated on the issue of Pashtunistan and its border conflict, the Durand Line. With the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the new Central Asian states, Pakistan was among the first countries in the region to realize the importance of this new development. Therefore, the Pakistani leaders expanded their strategy beyond the border problems with Afghanistan and the issue of Pashtunistan. This expansion made the Pakistani leaders look for a long-term ally in Afghanistan. General Zia's doctrine was

based on a religious interpretation of such a political movement in the region, and he desired to give Pakistan a leading status in this movement and use Afghanistan as the frontline to support and arm the Islamic resistance in Central Asia. Zia was ambitious and he declared at the height of the Afghan war in the 1980s that "we have earned the right to have a friendly regime in Afghanistan. We took risks as a frontline state, and we won't permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims on our territory. It will be a real Islamic state, part of a pan-Islamic revival that will one day win over the Muslims of the Soviet Union; you will see it" (Riedel, 2014: 59).

General Zia's forward policy toward Afghanistan looked to solve the conflict over the Durand Line and the Issue of Pashtunistan through the establishment of a friendly government in Afghanistan that would be dedicated to the pan-Islamic movement in the region. In this case, the border issue and the ethnic environment would be stable under the banner of the Islamic brotherhood. The issues of nationalism and political independence would lose their meaning; the solidarity of the Muslim brothers would be the main objective. Despite this strategy, Zia and his circle in Pakistan were invested on Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami (HIH) as the closest regional ally for the movement. This investment and alliance caused the Pakistan leaders to support a stronger role for Hekmatyar in the newly established government and greater domination of the HIH in Afghanistan (Nojumi, 2002: 183). The ISI director general, General Akhtar was Zia's former classmate, a Pashtun who knew the Afghan world well. He developed close working ties to many of the Afghan mujahedin leaders, especially fellow Pashtuns, and organized them into political parties to give more legitimacy to their struggle (Riedel, 2014: 59-60).

In Afghanistan, the emergence of the mujahedeen regional power under the political and military leadership of commanders such as Massoud, Ismail Khan, Maulawi Haqani, Haji Qadir, and Abdul Haq was an event that the Pakistani leaders had not anticipated. These regional military and political leaders ran their affairs independently; they did not operate under the direct control of the Peshawar based Parties leaders. These Commanders did not follow the pan-Islamic doctrine led by Zia and his Afghan allies. The emergence of these commanders challenged Zia's forward policy and the pan-Islamic doctrine in Afghanistan (Nojumi, 2002: 184).

According to the Pakistani journalist, Ejaz Haider, who interviewed Babar in April 1998, the advent of the Bhutto government in October 1993 had made Hekmatyar expendable. One reason was domestic: his close links with Pakistan's Jamiat, now in opposition and fierce rival of the Jammat-e-Ulamaa-e-Islami Pakistan JUIP and its chief, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, now allied with the government. Hekmatyar had also become a diplomatic embarrassment to Pakistan because of the enormous sufferings he was inflicting on the Kabul population in his heavy-handed efforts to dislodge the Rabbani-Massoud duo. Another consideration may have been Tehran's annoyance at Islamabad's interference in Afghanistan, aimed at sabotaging Iran's genuine interest in its neighbor, including the welfare of its Shiite population. This was clearly expressed during Bhutto's visit to Iran in November 1993. The Iranian President Rafsanjani warned her that if Islamabad were to pursue its policy of installing a client government in Kabul, Tehran might be forced to exercise a military option to resolve the issue. The warning was taken seriously, and discussed by Bhutto at a closed meeting with a few selected members of her cabinet.

Babar's southern route project required the cooperation of the Ismail Khan. The circumstances appeared to be propitious to detach him from his Jamiat allies in Kabul. Tensions with the Kabul government had developed as a result of the governor's independent stance on the running of his administration of a region that was becoming prosperous and where order and stability prevailed. The object of Babar's visit to Herat with six ambassadors in September 1994 was to secure Ismail Khan's assistance in return for the economic and political gains he could obtain through the opening of the southern route. This was followed up by Bhutto's visit on 28 October to Turkmenistan, where she met with Ismail Khan and Dustum.

The failure of the mujahedeen to bring peace to Afghanistan after the Soviets left in 1989 opened the way for a movement which would do just that. The population was prepared to accept disciplines of stability were guaranteed. There were many who had fought the Soviets and had become disillusioned with the never-ending fratricidal strife. They formed the fighting backbone. Then there were the young and idealistic looking for an organization in which they could realize their ambitions to serve Allah and their fellow men. Many had received an education in the refugee camps in Pakistan (McCauley, 2002: 78).

The advent of the Taliban, their seizure of Kandahar and subsequent conquest of Helmand, opened golden new windows of opportunity for Pakistan, not only with respect to the security of the southern route. By getting on board Ismail Khan in the west, and eventually Dustum in the north, Pakistan hoped to work them into a strategic alliance with the Taliban that would not only isolate and weaken the Kabul regime, but also facilitate the recognition of the Taliban heading a broad based government: a friendly Kabul regime would, in the longer term, serve Pakistan's broader strategic interests. In the case of Dustum, Islamabad tried to woo him by various means, including assistance in operating the Shiberghan gas fields and telephone connections to Mazar-i-Sharif (Rassanayagam, 2011: 147).

It transpired, however, that the Taliban had developed their own agenda and refused to dance to the Pakistani tune. The first major expression of Taliban independence was their decision to take Herat in March 1995, pointedly ignoring Pakistani advice to the contrary. After the unfortunate choice of Hekmatyar as Pakistan's instrument, which was the first mistake in her Afghan policy, switching her support to the Taliban as a means of realizing her regional ambitions was Pakistan's second biggest failure, an even more costly one in international terms, as it led to her isolation in the region as a whole (Ibid: 148).

However, the heavy Pakistani involvement providing logistical support in Taliban field operations was no secret to informed observers as early as 1995. The generous Saudi funding was also well known. The United States, while not directly implicated, was not an uninterested party. An eventual take-over of Afghanistan by the Taliban, with their Pakistani allies playing the role of midwife, would have served both the US political strategy of 'containing' an Iran perceived as irremediably hostile and as a launching pad for anti-American terrorist activities, as well as its economic interests in fostering, inter alia, an alternative land route through Afghanistan and Pakistan for the exploitation by US-led companies of the seemingly inexhaustible oil and gas reserves of Central Asia (Rasanayagam, 2011: 143).

Pakistan's Policy Toward Afghanistan (1996-2001)

The new approach toward Central Asia changed the nature of the Pakistan policy from an armed struggle into a market-oriented one. Pakistan leaders

knew that reaching Central Asia without Afghanistan was impossible; therefore, the establishment of a friendly and trustworthy government in Afghanistan became one of the most crucial tasks for Pakistan. This was one of the most important reasons which Pakistan leaders rejected a joint government comprised of the Hezb-e-Watan (Homeland Party, led by Dr. Najibullah) and the mujahedeen parties.

An independent Afghanistan with a sophisticated army, dominated by those regional commanders who were not committed to Pakistan pan-Islamism, would be considered a serious threat. Such government could cut off Pakistan from Central Asia in the event of conflicts. Or, at a time of conflict with India over Kashmir, Afghanistan may join India. Therefore, the Pakistani leaders attempted to use all their diplomatic, political, and military forces to reject Dr. Najibullah's government proposal for peace and also prevent mujahedeen leaders from opening a dialogue with Dr. Najibullah.

After the fall of Dr. Najibullah's government, and the establishment of the Islamic state of Afghanistan (ISA), Pakistan's pro-pan-Islamic leaders, in particular in the ISI, attempted to expand their influence in the ISA by supporting Hekmatyar against the Afghan government led by Mujaddidi, and later by Rabbani. The main factor for supporting Hekmatyar against the ISA was the influence of ex-Watan party political and military forces, and also the mujahedeen forces under the leaderships of independent commanders, such as Massoud, Ismail Khan, and the Nangarhar Shura. If these forces formed a central government and a united national army, it would be almost impossible for Pakistan to influence Afghanistan. In this kind of development, Pakistan would not only face the reality of a strong, united, and independent Afghanistan, it might be restless from the issue of Pashtunistan and the border conflict with Afghanistan (Nojumi, 2002: 184-85).

The end of the Cold War had opened up new perspectives for Pakistan's regional ambitions. With the independence of the Central Asian states, Afghanistan's northern frontier was no longer a barrier to legitimate trade with the south. Islamabad had become enamored since 1991 of the idea of winning a privileged place for Pakistan in Central Asian markets. But a fresh outbreak of fighting between Hekmatyar and the Kabul coalition forces in January 1994 made the traditional northern route from Peshawar via Kabul and the Salang Tunnel impracticable. Also the increasing hostility of the Kabul government, provoked by Pakistani's

continuing support for Hekmatyar, forced Islamabad to consider the feasibility of a southern route from Baluchistan to Turkmenistan via Kandahar and Herat. The stakes for Pakistani ambitions were raised even higher with the beginnings of intense international competition for the exploitation of the oil and gas reserves of Central Asia and the Caspian Basins (Rasanayagam, 2011: 144).

Pakistan's Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, had sent the convoy with orders to traverse western Afghanistan and blaze a trade route to the newly independent Muslim countries of Central Asia. Bhutto hoped to thus end Pakistan's historic isolation; she also coveted a share in the sought-after rights to Central Asia's rich oil and gas fields. Pakistan had flown foreign investors to Kandahar and Herat, without consulting the government in Kabul (Wahab, 2007: 207).

Nearly all observers assert that the government of Pakistan was instrumental in the rapid rise of the Taliban, possibly even in its creation. The conclusion is based in part on ample evidence but also on the high level of military skill, planning, coordination, communications, and logistic support displayed by the Taliban forces from the very start. Among those who welcomed these Taliban gains were the private truckers bringing supplies to western Afghanistan and contraband goods back into Pakistan. The roads became much safer. Besides, a monthly charge from a single Taliban paymaster in Kandahar was a big savings over the repeated tolls levied by a long line of large and petty warlords all along the route. The truckers later donated to Mullah Omar's campaigns to capture the northwest; although the ISI was allied with Ismail Khan, tolls were becoming onerous (Wahab, 2007: 210).

The JUIP as a political party had won a few seats in elections to the National and Baluchistan Assemblies but had remained in opposition to governments. In 1993 the situation changed when it supported the victorious Pakistan People Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto. Its leader, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, was made chairman of the National Assembly's Committee for policy. He established close links with the army, the ISI and with Bhutto's Pashtun minister of the interior, General Naseerullah Babar. Babar had been the adviser to Banazir's father on Afghan affairs during the Daoud presidency, and now became the key figure of Pakistan's Afghan policy, relegating the Foreign Ministry and the ISI to a back-seat role. Maulana Fazlur Rehman in his turn was to become the most vocal advocate of

the Taliban in Pakistan after their appearance on the Afghan scene, lobbying Washington and other European capitals on their behalf, and successfully mobilized financial and other assistance from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

Pakistan interior minister Naseerullah Babar, had been behind Bhutto's Central Asia overture and her hopes for a road and railway link through western Afghanistan. The opening of the southern route became Babar's obsession; in September 1994 he visited Chaman, the last Pakistani way-station before Kandahar, surveyed the highway inside Afghanistan, and announced the experimental use of the road by Pakistani traders. That same month, he took a party of six Islamabad-based ambassadors from potential donor countries to Kandahar and Herat, in the hope of raising \$300 million to rebuild the highway between Kandahar and Herat, and additional funds for a railway track and a satellite communication system. So brazen had Pakistan's interventions become that this trip was undertaken without the prior authorization of the Kabul government that held Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations. After the Taliban capture of Kandahar, which surprised the Pakistanis and their mounting successes thereafter, Babar set up an Afghan Trade Development Cell within his Interior Ministry to coordinate with other ministries and corporations on the road project. The Cell becomes a source of considerable logistics and infrastructure support for the Taliban. He had organized the famous truck convoy, and his ministry provided much of the Taliban's early support until the ISI was convinced to switch from Hekmatyar (Rasanayagam, 2011: 144-45).

Apart from the hoped-for benefits of regional trade, Pakistan had no doubt tired of the constant warfare on its borders and had lost faith in the ability of the mujahedeen to end the turmoil. The government was also anxious to be unburdened of several million pauperized refugees. A pliant government in Kabul could also be counted on to keep a lid on the old Pashtunistan issue (Wahab, 2007: 211).

Pakistan's policy of gaining strategic space is not a new phenomenon, but lately it has been directly related to carving out a larger Islamic entity jointly with the global Islamic Jihad movement. Many observers believe that a proxy war is already developing between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan. Islamabad has viewed its Afghan policy through the prism of denying India any advantage

in Kabul, and for nearly six years had successfully blocked Indian presence in Kabul through India-hating Taliban. The ISI saw the Northern Alliance supported by Americans, with all of Pakistan's regional rivals-India, Iran and Russia- as claiming victory in Kabul. This, for Pakistan's military regime, was a strategic disaster, and prompted the ISI to give refuge to the escaping Taliban, while denying full support to the new Afghan government (Ghosh, 2011: 27).

Pakistan's army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani has described main concerns to General David Petraeus who replaced General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan before making new Af-Pak strategy by Petraeus:

Despite the need for peace between India and Pakistan, Pakistan's national security doctrine requires it to weight New Delhi's expanding military capability and regional influence in Afghanistan rather than its professed peaceable intentions because "intentions could change at any time". Therefore, India remains a constant threat. Pakistan needs a "stable, peaceful and friendly", not "neutral" but "friendly" because of the India factor. New Delhi is establishing a hegemonic foothold in Kabul. In the past, secular-communist or pro-India regimes in Kabul like Karzai's have refused to accept the Durand Line as the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and coveted Pakistan's Pashtuns areas. Under the circumstances, Islamabad seeks to establish guarantees that the Pashtuns of Afghanistan will look to Kabul for nationhood and the Pashtuns of Pakistan, who number more than those of Afghanistan, will not be distracted from looking to Islamabad for theirs. Therefore, Pakistan requires "soft strategic depth" in Afghanistan ("Road to Kabul" (editorial). The Friday Times. Vol. XXII, No. 20 (July 2-8, 2010).

We can sum up Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan as follows:

Strategic interests: maintain territory integrity, secure eastern and western borders (Ateeq, 2008-09: 42).

Political interests: Pakistan wants to see a puppet and friendly government in Afghanistan to serve Pakistan's interests, giving the Pashtuns their due share in power.

Economic interests: a peaceful Afghanistan that enables the laying of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asian Republics (CARs) and makes Pak-Iran-India pipeline project successful, through Afghan territory to Pakistan. (Osman, 2005: 53).

In this way, Pakistan could be able to fulfill its increasing demand of industry at home. Moreover, CARs represent a huge market for Pakistani goods.

Conclusion

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have essentially remained estranged, despite their shared geography, ethnicity and faith. While the principle historical cause of this attitude has been the unresolved issue of the Durand Line (1893), tensions and suspicion between Pakistan and Afghanistan have also emanated from their divergent strategic outlook and dissimilar national ethos. It is important to note that Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan's admission to the United Nations.

The direct involvement of Pakistani military leaders and the ISI began with a failed coup led by Muslim Brothers of Afghanistan against President Daoud in the spring of 1974. After the coup crashed, many of the Muslim brothers escaped to Pakistan, where they received direct support from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime.

Following the advice of ISI, led by the Pashtun general Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, General Zia made the decision to throw his country's resources behind the Afghan resistance, thus assuming the roles of defender of Islam and front-line coordinator of the global fight against communism. The arrival of large amounts of international aid particularly that from the United States, to the hands of the Pakistani government made the ISI a custodian of the mujahedeen leaders. Even after Zia, this situation enabled the ISI to not only put pressure on Afghan leaders, but also give political muscle to the ISI leaders to filter out the Afghan political activists, in particular in Pakistan. This situation led the ISI to act against any mujahedeen organization both inside and outside who wanted to run the war against the soviets in accordance with Afghanistan interests.

The activities of the ISI came under pressure by the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations after the withdrawal of the Soviets in Afghanistan. In this period of time, the ISI pushed a military solution against Kabul regime. The ISI supported the military coup led by General Tanai and Hekmatyar against Dr. Najibullah in March 1990. The defeat of this military coup was a big blow to the ISI's regional strategy and caused more pressure from the non-military political leadership of Pakistan on the ISI.

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military plan with forces of Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar (HIH) against Kabul regime. This militaristic plan aimed to capture Kabul and was in full force when the governments of Pakistan, Iran, Russia, the United States, and the rest of the mujahedeen leaders in Pakistan agreed to the UN peace plan. On the eve of the successful implementation of the UN peace plan in Afghanistan, the ISI, through Hekmatyar and non-Afghan volunteers, led hundreds of trucks loaded with weapons and fighters to the southern part of Kabul.

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After the collapse of the Soviet empire, Central Asia emerged as a vital market for the economic and the regional development. During the Cold War, Pakistan's strategy toward Afghanistan concentrated on the issue of Pashtunistan and its border conflict, the Durand Line. With the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the Central Asian states, Pakistan was among the first countries in the region to realize the importance of this new development. Therefore, the Pakistani leaders expanded their strategy beyond the border problems with Afghanistan and the issue of Pashtunistan. This expansion made the Pakistani leaders look for a long-term ally in Afghanistan. General Zia's doctrine was based on a religious interpretation of such a political movement in the region, and he desired to give Pakistan a leading status in this movement and use Afghanistan as the front line to support and arm the Islamic resistance in Central Asia.

The advent of the Taliban, their seizure of Kandahar and subsequent conquest of Helmand, opened golden new windows of opportunity for Pakistan. By getting on board Ismail Khan in the west, and eventually Dustum in the north, Pakistan hoped to work them into a strategic alliance with the Taliban that would not only isolate and weaken the Kabul regime, but also facilitate the recognition of the Taliban heading a broad based government: a friendly Kabul regime would, in the longer term, serve Pakistan's broader strategic interests.

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knew that reaching Central Asia without Afghanistan was impossible; therefore, the establishment of a friendly and trustworthy government in Afghanistan became one of the most crucial tasks for Pakistan. This was one of the most important reasons that, Pakistan leaders rejected a joint government comprised of the Dr. Najibullah regime and the mujahedeen parties.

An independent Afghanistan with a sophisticated army, dominated by those regional commanders who were not committed to Pakistan pan-Islamism, would be considered a serious threat. Such government could cut off Pakistan

from Central Asia in the event of conflicts. Or, at a time of conflict with India over Kashmir, Afghanistan may join India. So, the Pakistani leaders attempted to use all their diplomatic, political, and military forces to reject Dr. Najibullah's proposal for peace and also prevent mujahedeen leaders from opening a direct dialogue with Dr. Najibullah regime.

Therefore, despite United Nations and other regional and International powers efforts; because of Pakistan's interferences, Afghanistan couldn't succeed to reach a peacefully settlement; and, unfortunately the civil war continued till today.

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