INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AS A DIRECTION
IN THE METHODOLOGY OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH

This article addresses the increased interest in intellectual history as a line of research. Additionally, focus is placed on the subject of intellectual history research, which covers many types of human creative activity. The authors of the article see it, rather, not as a subdiscipline of history, but as an interdisciplinary field focused on clarifying problems and drawing attention to boundaries, and believes that it should not follow one "correct" approach. The authors contend that the issues of religion and identity, problems of collective motivation, and our relationship with the natural world are important topics in intellectual history today. Intellectual history offers what other areas of history could not. Historians' claims are more restrained than those of philosophers and social scientists. In modern intellectual history, the desire to unite the efforts of all specialists whose professional interests are associated with the study of various types of human creative activity, including its conditions, forms and results, prevails. This, however, does not deny the existence of more moderate versions of "intellectual history", limited to the study of exclusively the intellectual sphere of consciousness, in particular the outstanding personalities of the past. Thus, in their scientific quest, intellectual historians can turn to disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, philosophy, literature and its criticism, but at the same time they should not neglect their own task and the restrictions imposed by their cultural horizons and disciplinary rules. When building a cultural context, intellectual history becomes an internal part of cultural history, and cultural history serves as the external side of intellectual history; therefore, historians should pay attention to both the internal and external.

Key words: intellectual history, methodology, history of ideas, sociohistoricism, culture, mindset, history of mentalities, creativity, explanation.
В данной статье рассматривается возросший интерес к интеллектуальной истории, как направлению исследовательской деятельности. При этом акцентируется внимание на предмете интеллектуальной истории, который охватывает многие виды творческой деятельности человека. Авторы статьи видят ее, скорее, не как субдисциплину истории, а как междисциплинарное поле, ориентированное на прояснение проблем и привлечение внимания к границам, и считают, что она не должна следовать одному "правильному" подходу. Авторы полагают, что сегодня важными темами интеллектуальной истории являются вопросы религии и идентичности, проблемы коллективной мотивации и наши отношения с миром природы. Интеллектуальная история предлагает то, что не могли предложить другие области истории. Утверждения историков являются более сдержанными по сравнению с утверждениями философов и представителей социальных наук. В современной интеллектуальной истории преобладает стремление объединить усилия всех тех специалистов, чьи профессиональные интересы связаны с исследованием разнообразных видов творческой деятельности человека, включая ее условия, формы и результаты. Хотя это и не отрицает существования более умеренных версий "интеллектуальной истории", ограниченных изучением исключительно интеллектуальной сферы сознания, в частности выдающихся личностей прошлого. Таким образом, в своих научных поисках интеллектуальные историки могут обращаться к таким дисциплинам, как экономика, социология, политология, антропология, философия, литература и ее критика, но одновременно они не должны забывать о собственном задании и о тех ограничениях, которые налагаются их культурным кругозором и дисциплинарными нормами. При выстраивании культурного контекста интеллектуальная история становится внутренней частью культурной истории, а культурная история служит внешней стороной интеллектуальной истории, поэтому историки должны обращать внимание на эти обе стороны – внутреннюю и внешнюю.

Ключевые слова: интеллектуальная история, методология, история идей, социоисторизм, культура, мышление, история ментальностей, творчество, объяснение.

Introduction

On the development of humanitarian and scientific knowledge in general in the second half of the twentieth century. – the beginning of the XXI century. The decisive influence was exerted both by profound socio-political changes associated with the global rivalry of political systems, the collapse of the communist system, and qualitative shifts in the scientific understanding of the modern state of mankind. The formation of social ideals of democracy, cultural pluralism and a market economy, the scientific and technological revolution have posed a number of complex worldview problems for historians. This contributed to the introduction of significant adjustments in the scientific picture of the world, the system of social values, priorities and orientations.

At the end of the XX – beginning of the XXI century, new trends are observed in the development of world historical thought. The most significant of these is the gradual shift in the attention of researchers from the so-called “social structures” (economic, social and other processes) to internal – conscious ones. As a result, in the field of view of historians were individual and collective consciousness, mentality, and the spatial framework narrowed to the level of microprocesses – the study of individuals, small groups and communities for their perception and reflection of their social environment and reactions to it. Turning to the sphere of consciousness, ideas, mentality, historians found themselves in the world of spiritual phenomena, culture, ideology, the study of which requires new methodological approaches and tools.

It was in this direction that postmodernism pushed the methodology of history. Historical knowledge becomes more addressed to a person and his diverse communities, and social processes are receding into the background upon which each individual or group relates their experience. History is split into a variety of individual and group stories, where consciousness, ideas and culture become the starting point. In other words, historical knowledge predominantly provides information not about real reality, but about the state of consciousness of the person or group that perceive and interpret this reality. Therefore, the task of the historian, in the
opinion of postmodernists, should be not so much the search for historical truth, but the presentation of the image of the past constructed by him on the basis of an individual reading of historical sources and his own ideas. Postmodernism found its original reflection in one area of historical science – “intellectual history”, which took on a new life at the end of the twentieth century, after overcoming a crisis. Proceeding from this, the purpose of this article is to analyze the essence and evolution of “intellectual history” as a specific approach in historical knowledge, its theoretical and methodological principles, which have found their reflection in the scientific activities of the supporters of this approach.

Historical science is experiencing at the end of the XX century deep inner transformation, which is clearly manifested on the surface of academic life – in a difficult change of generations, intellectual orientations and research paradigms, the very language of history. The modern historiographic situation is increasingly and more confidently characterized as postmodern. If we compare some aspects of the historiographic situation of the late 60s and early 70s with the modern one, then the contrasts between them are striking. These are, first and foremost, fundamental differences in understanding the nature of the historian’s relationship with the source, the subject and methods of historical knowledge, the content and nature of the received historical knowledge, as well as the form of its presentation and subsequent interpretations of the historical text. One of the most notable signs of change has been the intensive use of literary sources in historical works with the help of theories and methods borrowed from modern literary criticism. The postmodern paradigm, which first of all seized the dominant positions in modern literary criticism, spreading its influence to all spheres of humanist knowledge, questioned the foundations of historiography: 1) the very concept of historical reality, and with it the historian’s own identity, his professional authority (erasing what seemed the indestructible line between history and literature); 2) criteria for the reliability of the source (blurring the line between fact and fiction) and, finally, 3) belief in the possibility of historical knowledge and the pursuit of objective truth.

One of the most interesting areas of application of postmodern theories today is the history of historical consciousness, in the subject field of which promising prospects for a fruitful synthesis of new cultural and intellectual history open up. The “reunification” of history with literature has awakened an increased interest in the ways of producing, preserving, transmitting and manipulating historical information.

Work in this regard is just beginning, it is announced mainly in the form of research projects. It, in particular, manifested itself in the reports presented at the already mentioned section of the XVIII International Congress of Historical Sciences. Thus, the problems of historical memory were central in the message of the Spanish scholar Ignacio Olabarri (Olabarri, 1995), including the key and little-studied issue of the relationship between individual and collective historical consciousness and their role in the formation of personal and group identity. In many ways, a similar direction of research search was reflected in the report of the historian D. R Kelley, built on the analysis of a qualitative shift that occurred in the understanding of the tasks of history and in historiographic practice at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. and expressed itself in the shift of target attitudes from a simple description of the past to its “reactivation” or “revival in memory” (Kelley, 2002).

Theoretical and methodological bases

In modern intellectual history, the prevailing desire is to unite the efforts of all those specialists whose professional interests are related to the study of various types of human creative activity, including its conditions, forms and results. Although this does not deny the existence of more moderate versions of “intellectual history”, limited to the study of exclusively the intellectual sphere of consciousness, in particular the outstanding persons of the past. The three-level structure of research within the framework of “intellectual history” proposed by the French historian J. le Goff (Goff, 1988) should be mentioned, which includes the following levels: 1) the history of intellectual life, which is “the study of social thinking skills”; 2) history of mentalities, i.e. collective “automatisms” in consciousness; 3) history of value orientations (“ethics of human desires and aspirations”).

“Intellectual historians” try to overcome the opposition between the “external” and “internal” history of ideas and texts, between their content and context. The history of the sciences, for example, tends to focus not on ready-made knowledge, but on the activities associated with its “production”, not on doctrines and theories, but on the study of problems faced by scientists. A major event in the field of “intellectual history” at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries was the book by the professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania (Phila-
The book “Sociology of Philosophies” convincingly argues that research work in the history of ideas necessarily involves taking into account network factors, analyzing the struggle of individual thinkers and groups for attention, studying the specifics and patterns of the influence of different organizational foundations on the corresponding regrouping of intellectual factions, researching the patterns of flourishing and stagnation, ideological borrowing and “ideological export”, consideration of the context of involvement in long-term intellectual sequences. It is quite reasonable to expect that researchers’ interest will turn from “personal biography” and “historical context” to networks, communities, structures of the space of attention, a shift in its focus, rituals, ideas and doctrines as symbols of group membership, patronage systems, the influence of political and economic events on support systems and intellectual life. Something similar has already happened in literary studies, where the focus has shifted from a single text to intertextual links.

Since 1994 the International Society for Intellectual History has existed, and since 1996 the journal “Intellectual News. Review of the International Society for Intellectual History” has been published. The ideas of “intellectual history” were widely promoted in the pages of the Journal of the History of Ideas. The editor of the journal D. R. Kelley (Kelley, 2002) noted about the implementation of the project “new cultural and intellectual history”, which sees its main task in the study of intellectual activity and processes in the field of humanitariean, social and natural science knowledge in their socio-cultural context.

The origins of “Intellectual history”

“Intellectual history” as a historiographic practice has a long history and dates back to the 19th century. In the interwar period, its object-subject sphere was characterized by the American historian and philosopher Arthur Lovejoy. His main work – “The great chain of being. A study of the history of ideas” (Lovejoy, 2001). He proposed to study the universal “block ideas” that travel in time and are used as modules for analyzing complex constructions of different teachings and theories. The purpose of the historical research was to create the most complete biography of ideas, their description at different stages of historical development and in different areas of intellectual life, including philosophy, science, literature, art, religion, and politics. At the same time, the American scientist extended the subject sphere of the “history of ideas” to mental habits, the logic of thinking, and philosophical semantics.

A. Lovejoy’s program provided for an understanding of how new beliefs and intellectual forms arise and spread, and was based on an analysis of the psychological nature of the processes that affect...
changes in the popularity and influence of certain ideas. The historian’s main task was to find answers to the question: why do the concepts that dominated or prevailed in one generation lose their power over the minds of people and give way to others? Subsequently, the “history of ideas” was understood as certain autonomous abstractions that have their own internal logic, independent of other manifestations of human activity. In the context of the predominance of social history in Western historiography in the 60s and 70s, the views of the American scientist were criticized for ignoring the connection of ideas with the social context. The historiographic views of Arthur Lovejoy were largely formed as an alternative to the historical concepts prevailing at that time in the United States. Neither the Hegelian paradigm, which explains history by the development of the spirit, nor its variations suited Lovejoy. John Dewey’s (Dewey, 1960) socio-historicism did not suit him either. According to Lovejoy, in building his system of views, the latter’s argument relied too much on unstable grounds – the social needs of people. To a greater extent, Lovejoy was impressed by the Darwinian idea of evolution, which determined the topic of philosophical discussions in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Within the framework of the evolutionary paradigm, concepts that apply the principle of evolutionism to various humanitarian studies have developed and spread widely. The originality of Lovejoy’s approach manifested itself in the application of evolutionary ideas to the material of intellectual history.

The introductory chapter in his summary essay “Historiography of Ideas” was devoted to examining precisely the methodological and practical aspects of the study of the history of ideas. Lovejoy was primarily a practicing historian and most of his publications deal with specific empirical material. He worked carefully with historical texture, based on which he was engaged in methodological reflection. Working with specific sources, Lovejoy drew attention to the existence in the history of thought of certain patterns – the presence of similar elements in it. His main conclusion was the following: the basis of historical processes is a system of general representations, or ideas that make up the fabric of the thought process and ensure its continuity. In other words, ideas act as a connecting link in the history of human thought. Based on these assumptions and conclusions, Lovejoy (Lovejoy, 1960) proposed his own version of the explanation of the history of ideas and substantiated the advisability of applying an interdisciplinary research strategy. The essence of his methodology is in identifying and tracking “unit ideas” while simultaneously considering their manifestations in various fields – philosophy, psychology, literature, art, science, social thought. The essay “Historiography of Ideas” is mainly devoted to the consideration of an interdisciplinary approach. Lovejoy was one of the first in American humanities to raise the question of the negative consequences of narrow specialization in historical research. In universities, intellectual history is usually taught within the framework of various areas of historical knowledge: history of philosophy, history of literature, religion, economics. Lovejoy is convinced that disciplinary boundaries are arbitrary and artificial and do not correspond to the boundaries of real historical phenomena, between which there are many more connections than is usually assumed. In practice, researchers, in order to understand their subject, are often forced to go beyond it and turn to other areas of knowledge. Disciplinary delimitation significantly complicates the study of history, presents it in an incomplete or distorted form. In the essay, Lovejoy emphasizes the importance of establishing close ties between different areas of knowledge, finding points of contact between them. Firstly, by developing a joint research strategy. As such, he proposes his own historiographic strategy – the study of history as a “history of ideas” on the basis of an interdisciplinary approach. In the last decade of the XX century, the phrases “interdisciplinary approach”, “interdisciplinary research” have become firmly established in the lexicon of the scientific community. However, even at the beginning of the last century, tendencies towards narrow specialization prevailed. Calls for interdisciplinary cooperation were perceived as something radically new, as a challenge to the established tradition. In other words, Lovejoy contrasted the disciplinary division that prevailed in the faculties at that time with the methodology of a “single” intellectual history, covering different types of history. In his works, he touched on the problem of an interdisciplinary approach in historical research, new for that time.

**Features of the methodology of «intellectual history» at the present stage**

In the 70-80s of the XX century, the history of mentalities and the “anthropological turn” in the development of historical thought entailed a rethinking of the history of ideas. “Intellectual history” extends its cognitive field to the whole complex of ideas that appear in different periods and in different human communities. The general state of individual and collective consciousness is under the
purview of intellectual history, and it begins to mean the study of the entire intellectual sphere, or, in other words, “the study of past thoughts” (Skinner, 2002). This approach turned it into an interdisciplinary science, which is forced to rely on cooperation with other socially humanitarian branches of knowledge: it begins to combine the sociology of knowledge, the history of ideas, the history of mentalities, and hermeneutics. In fact, the subject field of modern “intellectual history” is unlimited – in fact, the whole history turns into an intellectual one.

We usually assume that history deals with the “past”. No matter how we talk about history: as the following of a law or the manifestation of accidents, as the implementation of universal or particular principles, as a sequence of unique or repetitive events, as an analogue of the natural-scientific method or its opposite, as an all—embracing narrative or timid fact—always implies that we are asserting something about the “past”.

Of course, we can create stories of anything, including the story of the story itself. Last, but not least, is and the history of ideas. As we can write the history of politics, so we can write the history of political ideas. If it is possible to ask what method (or methods) should be used in writing political, economic, military, scientific, and other forms of institutional history, it is obvious that the same questions can be raised, and even more sharply, in writing the history of philosophy. After all, any history of ideas, in its most significant aspects, can easily be reduced to the history of some scientific branch or to some facet of the history of philosophy. When we turn to the history of philosophy, we are forced either to focus primarily on the great texts, or, alternatively to reconstruct the hidden contexts in which these texts appear.

One of the main researchers in this field is Quentin Skinner (Skinner, 1988). Skinner paid special attention to the methodological side of the work, and in his bibliography, works on the history of ideas occupy about the same volume as publications on analytical philosophy and procedures for contextual reading of texts. In search of a foundation for his method, Skinner turned to the historical research of R.J. Collingwood (Collingwood, 1993), the anthropological concepts of C. Geertz (Geertz, 2000), the philosophy of the language of the late L. Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1988), the theory of paradigms by T. Kuhn (Kuhn, 1962) and the philosophical anti-fundamentalism of R. Rorty.

The most significant work on this topic was his extensive polemical article «Meaning and method in the history of ideas» (Skinner, 1969), in which Skinner asks the question: what methods should a researcher use to understand a particular work, whether it is a philosophical concept, a single concept, or an idea? Considering previous attempts to answer the question posed, he conditionally distinguishes two approaches: the first recognizes the full autonomy of the text, i.e. the text itself is the only adequate key for understanding its essence, while the second gives priority to the context, i.e. factors external to the text (religion, politics, economics), which set a solid framework for understanding the meaning of the text. In contrast, Skinner suggests that researchers focus their attention not on the meaning of individual words and ideas, but on their application. Understanding a specific idea involves fixing the ways the author uses a particular verbal expression of this idea, which is largely facilitated by referring to the context, i.e. the society in which the author lived, worked and wrote for. To understand a text, according to Skinner, means to understand the author’s intention to be understood, as well as the way in which the author wanted to make this intention available to the reader. Based on this, the method of the history of ideas as a means of deciphering the actual intentions of the author consists in delineating the linguistic context of the utterance, as well as identifying the connection of this utterance with the broader linguistic context. In cases that allow for ambiguous interpretation, the linguistic foundation of the study must necessarily be supplemented by a deep study of the socio-historical context. This is the main premise of Skinner’s methodological approach to the study of intellectual history and political theory. In an effort to avoid the numerous conceptual pitfalls characteristic of the work of predecessors, Skinner, in his methodology of intellectual history and political theory, focuses on the author’s intentions, considered in the context of the conceptual language or “ideology” of a particular era.

Despite the presence of certain shortcomings, repeatedly noted by critics, Skinner’s approach suggests a broad possibility of combining methods of philosophical and linguistic analysis and socio-historical research. Moreover, it avoids the extremes of other approaches to intellectual history and political theory, taking into account their main advantages. The task of the historian in the study of ideas, according to Skinner, is to identify a particular problem that gave rise to disputes and arguments of the parties or influenced the development of new intellectual schools. To do this, it is necessary to go deep into the arguments of the historical epoch in question in order to understand their meaning and
the true intentions of the authors of the texts under study. In addition to paying close attention to the specific context, Skinner draws the attention of researchers to the peculiarities of the language that the author uses to express his ideas. Thus, the focus of the research is not on the meaning of ideas, but on their language expression and use. Lovejoy is not far from Skinner when he claims that the researcher needs to understand all the varieties of meaning that the author could put into the words with which he expresses a certain idea. He fully agrees with the contextualist principle that the meaning of words can be determined by their use, which can also vary. On the other hand, Lovejoy does not imply that ideas are born exclusively in the logical context of discussion and debate. The mechanism of the emergence of ideas is less interesting for him than their impact on the development of intellectual thought. In addition, Lovejoy notes that the author may not be fully aware of the context of his thoughts, or ideas in general may arise outside of a certain context. In other words, ideas act not so much as a response to certain conditions, but as a self-generating force, prompted by the author’s intentions or emotions, which he is not fully aware of.

In this respect, the historical approach of Robin Collingwood is close to the concept of A. Lovejoy, who went much further and argued that historical knowledge requires the “reproduction” of the experience of the past or its “mental reconstruction” (D’Oro, 2002). The work of a historian, according to Collingwood, is close to the work of a detective who tries to solve a crime based on an analysis of evidence, trying to get into the mind of a criminal and understand his motives by reconstructing the circumstances of the case. Each event has an inner and outer side. It is impossible to limit oneself to a simple description of external circumstances. Only by reproducing and rethinking the inner side is it possible to adequately explain the events. Any text, according to Collingwood, should be perceived as an event, a process of thinking that comes from external circumstances and internal development of thought. In order to understand the true historical significance of the text, the historian needs to combine both of these sides.

Another methodological principle of the history of ideas is the requirement for a general cultural level of analysis, which implies the study of multi-level, multi-order phenomena that make up the intellectual context of the era. This requirement is realized through the study of the manifestations of certain idea-units in the collective thought of large groups of people, and not only in the teachings or opinions of a small number of deep thinkers or famous writers.

Traditionally, the historical disciplines have turned mainly to the analysis of the texts of the works of great authors, however, the historical understanding of their concepts is impossible without knowing how “they are connected with intellectual life, common morality and aesthetic values of this era.” Therefore, the subject of the history of ideas is the analysis of beliefs, tastes, prejudices, as the focus of ideas that have become widespread, established in many heads. Difficulties arising in the study of the history of ideas are due to the need to interpret and generalize the material of different areas of knowledge, to find the relationship between objects that, at first glance, have little in common. In addition, the history of any stages of human thought is characterized by a mixture of ideas, trial and error, but these mistakes themselves clarify to us the specific nature, aspirations, gifts and limits of the creator’s creation, as well as the logic of his reflection, in which these mistakes happened.

Further development of the history of ideas as a methodology of social and humanitarian cognition was associated with the analysis of various aspects of their existence in a wide intellectual and sociocultural context, their figurative and linguistic embodiment in other ideas.

John Pocock can be considered a researcher of Intellectual History. He is not only a practicing historian, but also an active theorist of historical and political-philosophical research, stimulating a whole trend in academic literature. So, in 1971, he published a collection of his own articles on the methodology of historical science “Politics, Language and Time: Essays in Political Thought and History” (Pocock, 1971), especially aimed at interpreting the historiography and political philosophy of history, including in the field of comparative history of political idioms related to the understanding of time and tradition.

The names of Pocock and Skinner are associated with radical changes in the methodology of the English-language history of political philosophy that occurred in the 1960 years. A curious feature of their revision of key concepts and approaches in intellectual history was the coincidence of two “turns”—historical and linguistic. By itself, this combination is not at all obvious: for example, the postmodern version of intellectual history underwent an almost reverse transformation in the 1970 years—in the works of H. White (White, 1987) and his followers, turning to the rhetorical nature of historiographic and, more
broadly, scientific texts meant a break with logic and the laws of historical research, denying the significance of historical interpretations and the relevance of attempts to reconstruct the “past”. In contrast, the Cambridge School of the History of Political Philosophy, like the anthropology of C. Geertz (Geertz, 1983), whose version of the analysis of ideologies through the interpretation of political metaphors is highly demanded by historians, combined attention to rhetoric and the historical method, which had two important consequences. First of all, one of the central concepts of the Cambridge approach has become the term “context”: Skinner [Skinner 1989], Pocock [1981], and J. Dunn [Dunn 1968] agree that the first task of the historian of philosophy is to reconstruct the historical meaning of speech actions. By “context” they mean, first of all, a polemical linguistic construction. We are not talking about natural languages, but about political languages, about a set of idiomatic matrices adopted in political philosophy and constituting the background in relation to which the author manifests himself. That is why Skinner and Pocock drew attention to the need to place the “classical texts” of the political science tradition in the broadest possible context of the writings of secondary authors, since the meaning of the speech act of those philosophers whom we consider significant becomes clear only when comparing their rhetorical strategy with the “rules of the political game” that reigned in their time.

Thus, when formulating his theses, the author performs two actions: on the one hand, he sets out a political argument in a specific historical situation, and on the other hand, he takes a certain position in relation to the languages and arguments of other authors – argues with them, confirms their solidity, ridicules, criticizes or simply does not notice. Initially, Skinner’s key area of interest is the author’s intention: he is more interested in those constellations of meanings that arise at the time of creation or publication of a text and determine the rhetorical intention of a political philosopher.

Thus, the history of philosophy, according to Skinner, presupposes a certain degree of freedom of the author’s will – the ability with the help of concepts to perform a large number of actions, in particular, to change the paradigms of describing a particular political phenomenon, in accordance with one’s own intentions in a given situation. Pocock partly criticizes and partly clarifies Skinner’s intentionalist line: in the review article published below on the state of the method in political philosophy, he raises the question of the fundamental impossibility of analyzing the author’s “intentions” outside the linguistic environment: in what sense can a historian study the author’s intention before that act, in which intention is expressed in speech, and outside it. Pocock talks about limiting the author’s self-manifestation, since he claims that the intentions themselves, in a certain sense, are already embedded in the language – the language provides the author with a certain repertoire of political idioms for describing political experience. The emphasis in methodology is shifting to language, or, more correctly, to languages connecting the author, message and reader.

However, the very richness and variety of available languages (as a consequence of the intensity of public debate in the studied political communities of the modern era, in which Pocock especially highlights the key role of religious, legal, philosophical and commercial idioms and the corresponding social institutions that legitimized political languages), and also, the possibility of linguistic innovations open to the author, who has a good command of the word, substantial freedom of speech. The relationship between individual acts of speech (parole), given and each time changing the structure of a common language for the community (langue), becomes the central theme of Pocock’s methodological reflection (Pocock, 1989/2009).

The history of discourses becomes even more complicated and enriched due to the fact that the initial situation in which the author speaks and performs his work is significantly different from the unpredictable chain of subsequent readings and interpretations of the texts by readers, often completely unfamiliar with the original context of the utterance. Classical texts, by virtue of their authority, by definition, find themselves in an open situation of multiple reinterpretations, the history of which can also be productively studied.

In general, the basic task of the historian of discourse is to analyze and master the basic idioms or languages that are available in a certain historical period to the widest possible circle of authors. The study of a specific author and a text is based on such a preliminary acquaintance, which allows you to indicate not only the languages used by the author, but also the possible linguistic innovations made by the author within the framework of the established relationship.

**Conclusion**

Representatives of modern “new intellectual history” focus on the phenomenon of the “historical text” itself and its perception by the reader. They
“Intellectual history” should be understood not as a section of history, but as a way of holistic consideration of the past of mankind. The task of the intellectual historian is to study all areas of the human past in its deciphering traces (usually written and figurative), providing them with modern meaning through language. In their scientific quest, intellectual historians can turn to disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, philosophy, literature and its criticism, but at the same time they should not forget about their own task and about the restrictions imposed by their cultural outlook and disciplinary norms.

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